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ABSTRACT  
   
The goal of this study is to use neoclassical realist methodology to add to the 
growing body of literature explaining why America is failing so horribly in its media 
war with militant Islamists. The general argument being conveyed is that 
inconsistencies in America's ostensibly liberal diplomacy strategy leaves it open to 
criticism and deprives it of the credibility necessary to muster an adequate rebuttal. 
To accomplish its aim, the analysis begins with an investigation into the origins of 
America's current liberal rhetorical approach. It is believed that with this sort look 
beneath the surface of the idealistic romanticism U.S. citizens have been continually 
conditioned to embrace, it becomes apparent that the grandiose pronouncements 
made by America's national political elite are actually based on rather dubious 
foundations. The evaluation then turns to a more focused rhetorical examination, 
which spans from the start of the so-called Arab Spring uprisings on December 18, 
2010 to the delivery of President Obama's highly publicized State Department 
address regarding these demonstrations on May 19, 2011, in order to go behind the 
White House's official statements and uncover what truly motivated its policy 
decision making. The belief here is that a close review of the administration's 
abysmal performance during this historic period assists in making the inadequacy of 
America's current rhetorical narrative all the more evident. Finally, once the 
contradictory nature of contemporary American liberalism has been fully 
demonstrated, the last section concludes with an effort to explain why replacing 
America's liberal strategy with a straightforward realist stance is best for both 
American's relations with the Muslim world and America's overall security. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2009, Voice of America reported that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton had been expressing concerns over the fact that the United States appeared 
to be losing its media war with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.1  Similarly, two years earlier, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
lamented “It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its 
message on the internet than America.”2  Naturally, such circumstances left many 
feeling quite perplexed.  The question was, “As one foreign diplomat asked a couple 
of years ago, ‘How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s 
greatest communication society?’”3  The situation simply seemed to make no sense.  
Of course, today the world knows that bin Laden had, in fact, not been 
hiding in a cave, but had, rather, been living in a compound in an upscale area of 
Abbottabad, Pakistan until his death at the hands of U.S. Navy Seals in May of 
2011.4  Certainly, however, his locale makes the degree of success he was able to 
achieve in comparison to America no less disturbing.  After all, even around the time 
of Secretary Clinton’s statement, polls actually showed bin Laden himself to be 
                                                 
1 VOA News, “Clinton Says US Losing Media War in Afghanistan, Pakistan, May 20, 2009,” Voice of 
America, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-20-voa51-68815317.html (Accessed 
June 19, 2009).   
 
2 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture (Kansas State University), November 26, 2007,” 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed August 13, 2010). 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Elisabeth Bumiller, Carlotta Gall, and Salman Masood, “Bin Laden’s Secret Life in a Shrunken  
World,” The New York Times, May 8, 2011. 
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generally unpopular in the Muslim world.5  Indeed, in Pakistan in particular, his 
confidence rating was only at around 18 percent.6  America’s problem, nevertheless, 
is that apparently U.S. policy has been even less popular.  In fact, as former head of 
the CIA’s bin Laden unit Michael Scheuer points out, the greatest ally bin Laden had 
over the years in his war of words with American diplomats was American 
diplomacy itself.7  According to Scheuer, the hypocrisy of America’s rhetoric and 
foreign affairs stance essentially did the al-Qaeda leader’s work for him.8  And 
Scheuer is certainly not the only American counter-terrorism specialist to recognize 
this.   
For example, after a viewing of the Power of Truth, an al-Qaeda documentary 
that builds a case against U.S. policy by using excerpts from American officials to 
corroborate its basic argument, one expert was forced to admit just how persuasive 
he himself even thought the film was: “It’s beautifully crafted propaganda, and it’s a 
huge problem for us,” said Jarret Brachman, research director at the Combating 
Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. “You’re left 
shaking your head and saying, ‘Yeah, I guess they’re right.’”9  Of course, neither of 
these analysts’ assessments should have been very surprising to Secretary Gates’ 
                                                 
5 Juliana Menasce Horowitz, “Declining Support for bin Laden and Suicide Bombing, September 10, 
2009,” Pew Research Center, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1338/declining-muslim-support-for-bin-
laden-suicide-bombing (Accessed August 10, 2010).  
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Michael Scheuer, preface to Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Washington 
D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004), xi. 
 
8 Michael Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq (2008; repr., New York: Free Press, 
2009), 261-262.  
 
9 Craig Whitlock, “Al - Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive,” The Washington Post, June 24, 2008. 
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associates at the Department of Defense because a 2004 strategic communication 
report created by their own Defense Science Board essentially stated the same thing.  
As the report explains,  
Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies.  The 
overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided 
support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, 
even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most 
notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan and the Gulf states.  
Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to 
Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy.10   
 
Of course, as a result, when the United States uses this sort of rhetoric it, in the end, 
does nothing but destroy its own credibility.11  And, obviously, without credibility the 
idea that America would be able to win a media war, even against a movement as 
unpopular as bin Laden’s, is rather unreasonable.    
Indeed, in full agreement with Scheuer, the Defense Science Board report 
argued that under such conditions the things the United States says, in reality, only 
end up helping its enemies.12  Hence, the more America struggles to raise its 
reputation, the more that reputation ultimately sinks.  With this paradoxical 
predicament in mind, the report looked to offer America’s political leadership a no-
nonsense critique that included sober minded recommendations for lifting the nation 
out of such a quandary: 
Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies.  But opinions must be taken 
into account when policy options are considered and implemented.  Policies will 
not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in 
ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments.  
Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
   
11 Ibid., 41. 
   
12 Ibid., 41. 
 
  4 
should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and 
double standards.”13 
   
Yet, despite the report’s frank analysis, even years after its release, as the above quote 
taken from Secretary Gates illustrates, U.S. officials were still pretending they were at 
a loss for why America had been so unsuccessful at communicating with the Muslim 
world.  Apparently, the report’s findings have simply been ignored, and, 
unfortunately, now that bin Laden has been killed, there is a good possibility that 
feelings of triumphalism will only increase the likelihood that they will continue to be 
so.  As shall be argued throughout what follows, however, America’s lofty liberal 
rhetoric about spreading democratic values, which it has duplicitously used over the 
years to justify its hegemony expanding policies, should now be replaced by a much 
more honest realist approach due to the contemporary Muslim world’s current 
sensitivity to American hypocrisy and America’s pressing need to find a means of 
honorably disengaging its military forces from that region of the globe as soon as 
possible.   
Undoubtedly, some who are opposed to this view may claim that, rather than 
trying to change its strategy, America should instead feel comfortable to merely 
“press forward” along its current path because, as Secretary Clinton has argued, 
“There is no better rebuke to al-Qaida and its heinous ideology” than the peaceful 
calls for democracy, which just so happened to have been spreading throughout 
Middle East and North Africa at the time of bin Laden’s death.14  What those 
making such claims would be forgetting, though, is that polls from that region of the 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 3. 
   
14 Hillary R. Clinton, “Remarks on the Killing of Usama bin Ladin, May 2, 2011,” 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/05/162339.htm (accessed May 8, 2011).  
  5 
world show many people living there were already expressing their lack of 
confidence in bin Laden’s ideology even when Mrs. Clinton was bewailing his 
rhetorical success over America two years ago.  Thus, the U.S. should in no way see 
such events as a victory in its struggle for hearts and minds, because the United 
States is itself no further along than it was then.  Essentially, very little has changed.       
The truth is, as surveys showed long ago, the majority of the people in the 
Muslim world have for some time wished for democracy.15  Nevertheless, according 
to the Pew Research Center, now that the chance for political change has presented 
itself, majorities or pluralities in almost every Muslim nation polled actually expressed 
their disapproval of how the situations in places such as Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and 
Libya have been handled by America’s leadership.16  In fact, the only country in 
which this was not the case was Pakistan, and this was only so in that instance 
because the majority there offered no opinion on the matter at all.17  Hence, if 
anyone truly believed American diplomacy was headed in the right direction, clearly, 
they were mistaken. 
Moment of Clarity 
As Scheuer argued when he was asked about the U.S. response to the so-
called Arab spring demonstrations, “We [i.e. Americans] tend to think that Muslims 
are stupid people.  That they’re going to forget that the United States supported 
                                                 
15 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, “Who Will Speak for Islam?,” World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 
(Fall 2008): 51-52. 
 
16 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. Image, May 17, 2011, 12, 54,” 
Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Arab-Spring-
FINAL-May-17-2011.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).  
 
17 Ibid. 
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tyranny for 35 years.”18  As result, there seems to be the amazingly absurd belief that 
U.S. leadership can simply play the innocent bystander after decades of siding with 
dictators, and the Muslim world will naively excuse America as having no part in the 
turmoil.  Quite to the contrary, nonetheless, most Muslims plainly recognize the 
regimes they oppose have only been able to oppress them because patron nations 
such as the United States have supplied the means for that oppression.  They, 
therefore, see America’s reluctance to make a clear break with its past as an 
indication of its unbroken complicity.   
Of course, America’s continued use of its liberal rhetoric about the spread of 
democratic values only amplifies this cause for grievance because it highlights how 
the nation, in fact, should be acting internationally if it was what it claimed.  For 
example, when asked if the United States had acted too slowly in supporting the 
demonstrations in Egypt, Sarah Abdel Rahman, one of the young student activists 
responsible for organizing the protests, replied  
“Yes, especially when, you know, we get hit with tear gas, and then we pick it up 
after, you know, the tear gas is completely taken over -- over our bodies, and we 
see the mark, ‘Made in the USA.’  So that -- that did not really send the message 
that I think President Obama is always talking about, about American values.”19  
  
And as data from the Pew Research Center clearly shows, the disapproval Mrs. Abdel 
Rahman expressed certainly does not place her in the minority.   
Indeed, only 22 percent of Egyptians surveyed said they believed America’s 
response to the political situation in their country had any sort of positive effect on 
                                                 
18 Michael Scheuer, interview by Eliot Spitzer, In the Arena, CNN, May 16, 2011.   
 
19 Sarah Abdel Rahman, interview by Fareed Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria GPS, CNN, May 22, 2011. 
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how things were turning out at all.20  Meanwhile a 39 percent plurality claimed 
America’s response actually had a negative impact.21  Similarly, when asked the 
broader question of how they felt about President Obama’s overall handling of 
regional calls for political change in nations such as Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and 
Libya, the majority of Egyptians stated they disapproved of it, with a plurality 
expressing the view that he was showing far too little support for such change.22  
Undoubtedly, though, what will seem most troublesome to those who believe these 
cries for transformation automatically mean the United States is somehow winning 
the media war against Islamist extremism is the fact that Pew Research Center data from 
the same period also showed that while Egyptians gave bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
organization a favorable rating of only 21 percent, the U.S. ranked just below it at 20 
percent.23  Obviously, something is not going according to America’s war plan.   
The greatest impediment to America recognizing what that thing is, though, 
is its own intransigence.  Regrettably, the country’s leaders have stubbornly 
continued to act as if there are no major inconsistencies in U.S. policy, and its people 
have blindly gone along with them without fully considering what they are being 
told.  Tenuous justifications are given for highly questionable acts, and willfully 
                                                 
20 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders, Religious Parties and Military, 
as Well, April 25, 2011, 24,” Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/04/Pew-Global-
Attitudes-Egypt-Report-FINAL-April-25-2011.pdf (Accessed May 19, 2011). 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Ibid., 4. 
 
23 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. Image, May 17, 2011, 7, 29,” 
Pew Research Center, http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Arab-Spring-
FINAL-May-17-2011.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011). 
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ignorant citizens simply accept them as solemn fact.24  Clearly, however, there must 
be a change.  Of course, this is not to naively say that each and every aspect of 
government operations must be disclosed.  Indeed, in certain critical situation, such 
as that during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is only to be expected that information will 
be withheld, or even lied about, for the sake of national security.25  Yet, it must also 
be realized that a constant pattern of duplicity will, in the end, only destroy 
America’s credibility.26  Thus, as uncomfortable as it may be, the truth must be told.         
As realist theorist Robert Jervis observes, the political and psychological 
inhibitions to trying to understand why one is hated often stem from the fear that 
doing so may lead to one asking if there is a legitimate cause for the antipathy.27  But 
at this point, Americans can no longer afford the luxury of merely burying their 
heads in the sand whenever they feel insecure about their foreign policy history.  The 
world is changing, and as new great power competitors such as China, India, and 
Russia begin to emerge, the United States cannot allow itself to be bogged down by 
unnecessary conflicts in the Muslim world.28  It is imperative that its leaders wake up 
and finally decide to be honest about the nation’s past so they can resolve any 
remaining issues and move on.   
                                                 
24 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 77-80. 
 
25
 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 31. 
 
26
 Steven R. Corman, Angeka Trethewey, and H. L. Goodall, Jr., Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Strategic 
Communication to Combat Violent Extremism (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 175-177.  
 
27 Robert Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?,” 
Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 42. 
 
28 Christopher Layne, “Graceful Decline: The End of Pax Americana,” Amconmag.com, May 1, 2010, 
http://amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/ (accessed December 10, 2011). 
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To assist in the promotion of this change, the following will set out to 
further detail how American hypocrisy has helped al-Qaeda militants accomplish a 
marginal victory in a media war that America’s leaders would have their fellow 
citizens believe the United States should be overwhelmingly winning.  Though the 
detrimental effects of America’s hypocritical foreign policy stance have obviously 
been discussed many times in the past, little effort has been made to do an extensive 
study focusing entirely on how this history of hypocrisy has affected the Muslim 
world’s view of America’s communication efforts.  The mission here, therefore, shall 
be to do just that.  It is hoped that by taking on this endeavor the truth will become 
just that much clearer to average citizens in the United States, and that they will in 
turn demand better from those charged with ensuring their security.        
To accomplish this task, the following will begin with an investigation into 
the origins of America’s current liberal rhetorical strategy.  It is believed that with 
this sort of look beneath the surface of the idealistic romanticism U.S. citizens have 
been continually conditioned to embrace, it will become apparent that the grandiose 
pronouncements made by America’s national political elite are actually based on 
rather dubious foundations.  The evaluation will then turn to a more focused 
rhetorical examination, which spans from the start of the so-called Arab spring 
uprisings on December 18, 2010 to the delivery of President Obama’s highly 
publicized State Department address regarding these demonstrations on May 19, 
2011, in order to go behind the White House’s official statements and uncover what 
truly motivated its policy decision making.  This analysis will center primarily on the 
protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Libya, the only nations mentioned by name 
in the Pew Research Center’s survey, so as to help shed the maximum amount of light 
  10 
on the type of behavior the respondents to the poll found so distasteful.  The belief 
here is that a close review of the administration’s abysmal performance during this 
historic period, with its perhaps unparalleled focus on issues of democracy in the 
Muslim world, will help to make the inadequacy of America’s current rhetorical 
narrative all the more evident.  Finally, once the duplicity of contemporary American 
liberalism has been fully demonstrated, the last section will then conclude with an 
effort to explain why replacing America’s liberal approach with a straightforward 
realist stance will be best for both America’s relations with the Muslim world and 
America’s over all security. 
Neoclassical Realism 
To assist in making the proposed argument for a realist rhetorical strategy as 
comprehensive as possible, the analysis described above shall make use of the 
neoclassical realist theoretical perspective.  The advantage of beginning from this 
analytical platform lies in the theory’s realistic understanding of how the world 
actually works.  Put plainly, 
Neoclassical realists understand that the real world is complex, not simple.  
Hence, the neoclassical school blends structural realist theory with historical 
explanation.  Indeed, as Gideon Rose comments, neoclassical realism stresses 
“detailed historical analysis.”  Recognizing that even the simplest explanations of 
a particular state’s grand strategy are complex, neoclassical realists sacrifice 
“rigor” for richness.  Rather than make a fetish of parsimony, they understand 
that case studies of a particular great power’s grand strategy need to pay attention 
to “historical context and particularity.”29 
 
In doing so, neoclassical realism permits the analyst to raise many of the finer details 
of historical causality, which are often missed by other realist researchers.   
                                                 
29 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 11.  
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Likewise, it should be pointed out that, though generally uncommon to 
certain realist approaches, “Neoclasscial realism focuses on internal variables as 
intervening variables between the pressures of the international system and the 
nation-state’s policymaking response.”30  What this means is that neoclassical realism 
leaves greater room in its description of world events for matters such as domestic 
political issues.31  Of course, in complement to what has already been explained 
above,  
Because neoclassical realism stresses the role played by both independent and 
intervening variables, it carries with it a distinct methodological preference--for 
theoretically informed narratives, ideally supplemented by explicit counterfactual 
analysis, that trace the ways different factors combine to yield particular foreign 
policies.  The neoclassical realist archetype is Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War, which grounds its narrative in the theoretical proposition that 
the “real cause” of the war was “the growth of the power of Athens, and the 
alarm which this inspired in Sparta,” and then describes how systemic incentives 
were translated through unit-level variables into the foreign policies of the 
various Greek city-states.32 
 
Hence, conceived thusly, it can be said that neoclassical realism, with its descriptive 
fullness, is imbued with a much greater capacity to account for situations driven by 
multiple levels of agency.  Realism’s mainstream structural model is known for its, 
perhaps, overly mechanical contention that conflicts between opposing actors arise 
as a consequence of the inevitable frictions associated with the self-help mentality 
that pervades the world’s anarchic international system of security competition.33  
                                                 
30 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ed., Making Sense of International Relations Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006), 13-15.   
 
31 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 
(October 1998): 144-172. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” International Studies Perspectives 2, no. 
3 (August 2001): 27. 
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The neoclassical variant of realism, however, also concedes to the fact that “Flesh-
and-blood officials actually make foreign policy decisions and sometimes they 
misperceive the actual distribution of power or make erroneous estimates about 
power trends.”34  The theory, therefore, allows for a closer look at the unique 
psychology that shapes individual incidents occurring in the international system.   
One such example of this sort of focus on human agency is neoclassical 
realism’s special emphasis on issues of national prestige.  Naturally, even here, the 
traditional understanding of material power still remains vitally important.35  But, for 
neoclassical realists “Perceptions of prestige – that is, a state’s reputation for having 
power, especially military power – and status – that is, a states recognized position 
within international hierarchy – also play an important role in world politics.”36  This 
recognition of the importance of prestige will become particularly relevant during the 
later examination of America’s intervention into Libya.  For it is America’s reaction 
to the Libyan uprising that, upon first inspection, may give some the impression that 
the United States, in reality, does act in accordance with the liberal democratic values 
it promotes.  Nevertheless, after the multiple layers of political nuance and spin have 
been peeled away, it shall become evident that at the core of the matter there remain 
the familiar principles of power politics. 
                                                 
34 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ed., Making Sense of International Relations Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006), 40. 
 
35 Ibid., 38. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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Despite this constant talk of matters of power, however, it should be noted 
that the focus of the analysis below shall not be entirely on such issues.  As 
Christopher Layne, a leading figure in realism’s anti-hegemonist branch, argues,  
Realist must shed their reticence to explicate the values underlying their policy 
preferences, because this reluctance allows their opponents to portray them – 
unfairly – as amoral (or even immoral).  Realist have a moral, as well as 
prudential, case against American hegemony, and they should not shrink from 
making it, because – unlike hegemonists – they have identified clearly the price 
the United States pays in trying to realize its hegemonic ambitions.37   
 
Hence, the argument that shall be laid out here will unapologetically side against clear 
examples of needless injustice.  Moreover, it shall do so, at times, in a rather explicit 
manner.  Nevertheless, even with that said, as a realist argument, it, unfortunately, 
will not be able to do much beyond that.  Surely, as offensive realist John 
Mearsheimer explains, “Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be 
desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition 
and war.”38  So, though realists can certainly make calls for rational restraint, they 
must also still recognize that the security dilemma that plagues the world system will 
likely carry on as an ever present reality, and that nations will, thus, need to continue 
to act accordingly. 
                                                 
37 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 203. 
 
38 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003), 17. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A HISTORY OF HYPOCRISY 
Of course, when considering how cynical the nature of realism is, it is quite 
easy to understand why persuading America’s political elite to move away from the 
path their liberal narrative has led them down would be difficult.  After all, despite its 
clear honesty, many Americans may find an unflinchingly realist approach to 
international relations (IR) somewhat unsettling.  As Mearsheimer observes,  
Americans are basically optimists.  They regard progress in politics, whether at 
the national or the international level, as both desirable and possible.  As the 
French author Alexis de Tocqueville observed long ago, Americans believe that 
“man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of improvement.”  Realism, by 
contrast, offers a pessimistic perspective on international politics.  It depicts a 
world rife with security competition and war, and holds out little promise of an 
“escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does.”  Such pessimism is 
at odds with the powerful American belief that with time and effort, reasonable 
individuals can cooperate to solve important social problems.  Liberalism offers a 
more hopeful perspective on world politics, and Americans naturally find it more 
attractive than the gloomy specter drawn by realism.39  
 
Thus, “Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in 
the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism.”40  Nonetheless, 
despite this public preference, this trend, as shall be fully explained in the sections 
that follow, will soon have to come to an end because it has now become 
exceedingly detrimental to U.S. security.  The world outside of America’s borders is 
no longer fooled, and preserving its prestige in the manner it has in the past will 
soon no longer be possible.  Therefore, the United States has no choice but to accept 
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that its current narrative simply cannot survive.  And its citizen can no longer be left 
to remain as blind as they currently are. 
Certainly, however, this is not to say that the vision liberalism proposes is 
itself objectionable.  Indeed, quite to the contrary, the romanticism that forms the 
foundation of much of liberal thought is extremely idyllic.  Nonetheless, once one 
takes the time to fully understand this theoretical model, one sees that in terms of 
real world applicability its Manichean simplism is quite problematic.41  As 
Mearsheimer explains,  
Liberalism’s optimistic view of international politics is based on three core 
beliefs, which are common to almost all of the theories in the paradigm.  First, 
liberals consider states to be the main actors in international politics.  Second, 
they emphasize that the internal characteristics of states vary considerably, and 
that these differences have profound effects on state behavior.  Furthermore, 
liberal theorists often believe that some internal arrangements (e.g., democracy) 
are inherently preferable to others (e.g., dictatorship).  For liberals, therefore, 
there are “good” and “bad” states in the international system.  Good states 
pursue cooperative politics and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad 
states cause conflicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their 
way.  Thus, the key to peace is to populate the world with good states.   
 Third, liberals believe that calculations about power matter little for 
explaining the behavior of good states.42 
 
They do, of course, on the other hand, freely acknowledge “Bad states might be 
motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other states, but that is only 
because they are misguided.  In an ideal world, where there are only good states, 
power would be largely irrelevant.”43  In contrast to this position, though, realist 
detractors such as Stephen Krasner argue that the problem with this sort of 
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understanding of global politics is that often the leaders of “good states,” who 
profess to believe in the tenets of international norms, in reality, only do so to 
conceal their power driven agendas.44   
Clearly, “There is not much controversy that norms affect verbal and 
rhetorical behavior.”45  After all, “Most statesmen claim that they accept these liberal 
norms and invariably emphasize their commitment to the rule of law.”46  But  
For realists, like Hans Morgenthau, however, the effect of norms was to generate 
the need for ideological disguises.  Norms established desired practices, not 
practices that actually prevailed.  They give rise to justifications, excuses and 
denials; ‘organized hypocrisy’, to use Krasner’s label.”47   
 
Thus, if anything, a leader’s claim that he or she honestly abides by liberal norms 
simply allows that leader to have an easier navigation around the political checks and 
balances that one who took an openly realist position would constantly be 
confronted with.48  And this is precisely what one sees in “good states” throughout 
the international system.            
For example, when reviewing American history “It should be obvious to 
intelligent observers that the United States speaks one way and acts another.”49  Yet, 
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despite the clear hypocrisy of the liberal rhetoric it uses to justify its actions, “Most 
Americans readily accept these rationalizations because liberalism is so deeply rooted 
in their culture.  As a result, they find it easy to believe that they are acting according 
to cherished principles, rather than cold and calculated power considerations.”50 
Nevertheless, 
As one would expect, the gap between what the United States prescribes for 
others and what it demands for itself has not gone unnoticed abroad.  Indeed, it 
is a key theme of many of Osama bin Laden’s denunciations, for he knows that 
accusing the United States of acting hypocritically is a potent weapon in the 
struggle for hearts and minds around the world.51 
 
The power of such an attack lies in the fact that “When foreign leaders and publics 
react to hypocrisy, they usually bring a much richer fund of moral condemnation.”52  
Thus, as shall be demonstrated later, the hypocritical actor will ultimately face 
compounded disdain stemming from both the negative action taken and what is at 
times perceived as the even greater offense of simply being a hypocrite.  
Unfortunately, though, America’s leaders seem not to understand this reality.  And as 
a result, they often feel emboldened to act internationally in a manner that can only 
be described as rampantly hypocritical. 
The George W. Bush Administration    
For instance, nine days after the attacks of September 11th, George W. Bush 
announced before a joint session of Congress that “Every nation, in every region, 
now has a decision to make.  Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  
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From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will 
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”53  What many Americans are 
likely unaware of, however, is that during Bush’s presidency his administration was 
itself, in fact, actively harboring and supporting members of an organization known 
as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), which has actually been on the U.S. list of 
terrorist groups since 1997.54   
The Mujahedeen-e Khalq, or People’s Mujahedeen, was first formed in 1965 
when the group splintered from a guerilla force in northern Iran.55  Violently 
opposed to Iran’s former Shah and those associated with him,  
Its hit men assassinated a dozen people, including an Iranian general and five 
American military and civilian technicians in the 1970s.  An operation in 1971 to 
kidnap the U.S. ambassador to Tehran, Douglas MacArthur III, failed.  But it 
helped the group heighten its profile among anti-shah terrorist outfits. 
 Later, the MEK would play a key role in the events that swept Ayatollah 
Khomeini to power.  The break with the Mullahs came when the People’s 
Mujahedeen, under its “Supreme Guide” Massoud Rajavi, attempted an armed 
uprising against the new regime in 1981.  Not allowed to field candidates in 
presidential and parliamentary elections, the MEK sent hit squads to assassinate 
prominent mullahs and raided several military bases.56             
 
One of the 1981 assassination attempts targeted Iran’s present Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, permanently disabling his right arm with a bomb.57  
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Another MEK linked bombing that year successfully killed the Islamic republic’s 
president and prime minister at the same time.58 
 As one would expect, the reprisal for this wave of terror was quite brutal, 
but, fortunately for the MEK, a deal was brokered with Saddam Hussein, who was at 
the time locked in a bitter war with Iran, which gave MEK forces safe haven in 
Iraq.59  As a result,  
Mr. Rajavi frequently visited Baghdad and formed a close relationship with 
Saddam, who set up camps in Iraq to train MEK militants for sabotage 
operations against Iran.  Even after the 1988 cease-fire between Tehran and 
Baghdad, Mr. Rajavi, with Saddam’s approval, continued a low-intensity war 
against Iran from Iraqi territory.60 
 
Then, “In 1991, the MEK’s 10,000-strong force in Iraq helped Saddam in his brutal 
campaign against Kurds and Iraqi Shiites, a campaign that left over 100,000 dead.”61  
The MEK’s role in the massacre would later be listed in the U.S. Department of 
State’s 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism.62 
 Nevertheless, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the members of 
the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, who once were known for condemning U.S. imperialism 
and singing “death to America,” were surprisingly placed under U.S. protection.63  
Moreover, not only were they allowed to maintain an American sanctioned base in 
Iraq, from which they broadcasted anti-Iranian propaganda, but they, in fact, also 
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became one of America’s sources of intelligence on Iranian paramilitary and nuclear 
programs.64  As time went on, some would even begin to suggest that the MEK 
should be removed from U.S. list of terrorist organizations altogether.65  This idea 
would remain a point of contention, however, because, according to a recent 
disclosure from the current State Department, the organization is still secretly 
training suicide bombers.66   
Totally dismayed by America’s defense of those associated with such 
activities, former Iranian president Ali Rafsanjani asked “Why terrorists who have 
committed crimes in Iran are not returned here?  Worse yet, they are permitted to 
enter your Congress, the U.N., and have lobbying and activities.”67  His cries, 
nonetheless, would ultimately fall on deaf ears.  Indeed, even when Iran signaled that 
it would be willing to exchange members of al-Qaeda that it was holding in custody 
for some of the MEK members under U.S. protection, American officials refused 
the offer citing concerns for the safety of those it would be turning over.68  What is 
interesting about this humanitarian reasoning, though, is that at the same time, as 
part of America’s extraordinary rendition program, the United States was 
systematically handing over other terror suspects to brutal regimes such as that of 
Syria, which the U.S. plainly understood would likely use torture on those it was 
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receiving.69  Hence, there was obviously something else at play in the case of the 
MEK.    
Only adding to the hypocrisy was America’s reaction to others who worked 
with the Mujahedeen-e Khalq.  In one particular case, a group of seven Iranian 
Americans who assisted the MEK found themselves fighting a legal battle for nearly 
the entire period of Bush’s two terms to avoid conviction on charges that they had 
provided material support to a terrorist organization.70  Their defense, of course, was 
that the United States, as court documents obtained during the case proved, was, 
indeed, providing material support to the group as well.71  Nevertheless, the charges 
still remained in place.    
 The Bush White House, however, was clearly not alone in terms of being 
hypocritical.  Indeed, when examining the way the two administrations that preceded 
it conducted themselves, one is struck by just how little a change in presidencies 
actually matters in regards to levels of American duplicity.  Generation after 
generation, both Republicans and Democrats act in the exact same fashion.  As 
Morgenthau and Krasner argue, liberal hypocrisy seems to simply be endemic to the 
current normative system itself.  A perfect illustration of this continuity of 
contradiction is the way in which the administration of Bill Clinton dealt with the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
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The Bill Clinton Administration   
Immediately after the Soviet-Afghan conflict of the 1970s and 80s, the nation 
of Afghanistan found itself entirely engulfed in a chaotic civil war.72  It seemed as if 
the decades of carnage that Afghans had suffered through perhaps might never end.  
But then, “As if out of nowhere, a band of madrasa students (taliban) appeared in 
late 1994 and within two years swept across the country.”73  The Taliban put an end 
to the violent power struggles that were raging throughout their land and finally 
restored a degree of order to a battle-weary nation.74  Unfortunately, though, for 
many people, the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic law made life under their 
rule extremely unpleasant.75   
Indeed, “Their list of banned items and activities unfurled as a roll call of 
life’s small pleasures: marbles, cigarettes, dancing, music, singing, homing pigeons, 
kite-flying, television-watching.”76  Their laws relating to women in particular, 
however, were even more archaic.  After the group secured their power base “They 
forced women to wear the chador, prevented women from working and girls from 
attending school, and imposed hadd punishments, including the stoning of 
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adulterers.”77  Taxi drivers were instructed not to stop for women in improper attire, 
and tailors were threatened with jail time if they took female measurements.78   
Unsurprisingly, then, when questioned about the conditions in Afghanistan, 
the Clinton administration felt obligated to express its disapproval of these 
developments.  For example, when asked about the Taliban’s policies in October of 
1997, White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry replied, 
We’ll, our assessment of human rights in Afghanistan are very consistent with 
what was reported in the most recent review of human rights situations around 
the world by the State Department.  We share the assessment that they’ve made, 
there is great concern we have vis a vis the Taliban.  We think there have been 
cases of abuse that were documented quite well in the State Department’s survey, 
but I would refer you for further comment over to the State Department.79 
 
That further comment would actually come quite forcefully just a few weeks later 
when, “During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright attacked Taliban policies as despicable and intolerable.”80  As she explained, 
“If a society is to move forward, women and girls must have access to schools, be 
able to participate in the economy and be protected from physical exploitation and 
abuse.”81  Later she would add “It’s very clear why we’re opposed to Taliban. We’re 
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opposed to their approach to human rights, to their despicable treatment of women 
and children and their lack of respect for human dignity, in a way more reminiscent 
of the past than the future.”82  Thus, at that point, the administration’s position on 
the Taliban seemed quite unambiguous.  Indeed, later, President Clinton would 
personally align himself with Secretary Albright’s strong stance at an observance of 
International Women’s Day.83  
Nevertheless, things were not quite as they seemed.  At the same time the 
administration was condemning the Taliban’s human rights abuses it was also, 
behind the scenes, courting the idea of working with the regime.84  The American 
energy company Unocal wanted to run a gas pipeline through Afghanistan from 
Turkmenistan and executives from the company had enlisted the help of the 
administration to work out some of the diplomatic aspects of the deal.85  Of course, 
the Taliban government the United States was castigating publically was no different 
than the one it was willing to cut deals with privately, but apparently, however, 
Unocal’s proposed plan for securing U.S. corporate interests, further limiting Iran’s 
domination of regional energy flows, and increasing funds for campaign financing 
outweighed America’s other concerns.86 
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In fact, Unocal would eventually be able to even make arrangements for 
members of the Taliban to travel to America for a meeting at the State Department.87  
During the trip, the Taliban ministers would be graciously treated to a visit to both 
NASA headquarters and Mount Rushmore.88  Ironically, the hope was that by 
exposing those who were thought to be guilty of human rights abuses to American 
culture they might come to think doing business with the United States was not so 
bad. 89  In other words, the White House knowingly allowed its understanding of 
morality to be turned on its head by American corporate executives simply for the 
sake of its interests.  Nonetheless, despite such a questionable compromise, and the 
intense effort put into the deal, it would eventually fall through when bin Laden, 
whom the Taliban had been harboring, simultaneously attacked two U.S. embassies 
in East Africa, killing over 200 people.90   
The George H.W. Bush Administration 
 As disastrously as the Clinton administration’s Taliban experience may have 
ended, though, perhaps no diplomatic episode of this kind has gained as much 
notoriety in recent times as George H.W. Bush’s relationship with Saddam Hussein.  
In 1984, Bush, who was then vice president under Ronald Reagan, met with 
Saddam’s foreign minister Tariq Azziz in Washington D.C. to officially mark the end 
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of 17 years of diplomatic estrangement.91  Iraq had initially severed ties with the 
United States because it accused America of assisting Israel in its 1967 war with 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.92  By 1980, however, Iraq found itself involved in a war of 
its own with its neighbor Iran and was quite soon thereafter looking to renegotiate its 
diplomatic alignment.93  Indeed, even three years prior to the ‘84 meeting in D.C., the 
U.S., which had also severed ties with Iran for its own reasons, had already removed 
Iraq from its list of nations harboring international terrorists and offered the Iraqis 
$1.6 billion worth of credits and credit guarantees for U.S. goods.94 
Nevertheless, it would not be long before hostilities between Iraq and the 
United States would resume.  In 1990, Saddam entered into another war, this time 
with America’s ally Kuwait, and Bush, who at that point had become president, 
decided to organize and oversee an international coalition against him.95  On the 
domestic side, Bush maintained support for the campaign by frequently speaking to 
the American people about the evils of the Saddam regime.  In fact, as illustrated in 
the example below, President Bush essentially argued that resisting such evil was the 
responsibility of a “good state”: 
The terror Saddam Hussein has imposed upon Kuwait violates every principle of 
human decency.  Listen to what Amnesty International has documented.  
“Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi 
forces…arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands…widespread 
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torture…imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of 
hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children.” 
 Including children -- there’s no horror that could make this a more obvious 
conflict of good vs. evil.  The man who used chemical warfare on his own people 
-- once again including children -- now oversees public hangings of dissenters.  
And daily his troops commit atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens. 
 This brutality has reverberated throughout the entire world.  If we do not 
follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then 
his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world 
order we now see: this long dreamed-of vision we’ve all worked toward for so 
long.96   
 
What is quite ironic about this statement, though, is the way in which the president 
tries to justify his “new world order” war by highlighting the cruelty of Saddam’s 
belligerent warmongering and his 1980s use of chemical weapons against his “own 
people” in Iraq’s Kurdish region.  After all, as Mearsheimer and Harvard realist 
Stephen Walt point out,                                                                                                                          
The United States backed Iraq during the 1980s – when Saddam was gassing 
Kurds and Iranians – and helped Iraq use chemical weapons more effectively by 
providing it with satellite imagery of Iranian troop positions.  The Reagan 
administration also facilitated Iraq’s efforts to develop biological weapons by 
allowing Baghdad to import disease-producing biological materials such as 
anthrax, West Nile virus, and botulinal toxin.97 
   
In fact, after the 1988 Anfal massacre of Iraqi Kurds, America, rather than cutting 
ties with Saddam, instead decided to reward him, once more, with billions of dollars 
worth of loan guarantees and commodity credits.98  Moreover, it was none other 
than Bush himself who, only a year after the Anfal incident, signed a national security 
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directive that proposed that normal relations between Iraq and the U.S. was good for 
both America’s long-term interests and promoting stability in the Middle East.99  
Sadly, it was not until after Saddam Hussein decided to defy the United States by 
invading America’s ally that the Bush administration began to condemn him as “a 
new Hitler.”100  Before then, he was just another addition to America’s long list of 
unsavory bedfellows.    
Once again, however, as with the other administrations mentioned, Bush 
certainly cannot be accused of being the first to make use of manipulative hypocrisy.  
Indeed, as Mearsheimer notes, policy “spin doctors,” as he refers to them, have a 
legacy of success in the United States that stretches back well before the first Hitler 
had even passed away:   
For example, in the late nineteenth century, American elites generally considered 
Germany to be a progressive constitutional state worthy of emulation.  But the 
American view of Germany changed in the decade before World War I, as 
relations between the two states deteriorated.  By the time the United States 
declared war on Germany in April 1917, Americans had come to see Germany as 
more autocratic and militaristic than its European rivals. 
 Similarly, during the late 1930s, many Americans saw the Soviet Union as an 
evil state, partly in response to Josef Stalin’s murderous internal policies and his 
infamous alliance with Nazi Germany in August 1939.  Nevertheless, when the 
United States joined forces with the Soviet Union in the late 1941 to fight against 
the Third Reich, the U.S. government began a massive public relations campaign 
to clean up the image of America’s new ally and make it compatible with liberal 
ideals.  The Soviet Union was now portrayed as a proto-democracy, and Stalin 
became “Uncle Joe.”101 
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Not surprisingly, after the war, America’s leaders had absolutely no problem turning 
the Soviets back into villains.  And, of course, this was quite fortunate because fear 
of the Soviet Union was essential to America’s rhetorical justification for expanding 
its influence in places like the Middle East.   
Roots of the Rhetoric 
As Christopher Layne points out, even as the Second World War was still 
raging the United States was already mapping out the possibilities for the expansion 
of its power in the post-war world, and these plans, despite what many may have 
previously believed about the Cold War era, were extremely ambitious.102  In fact,  
As the diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis observes, the United States 
“expected to lead the new world order” after 1945: “Few historians would deny, 
today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after 
World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear 
and present antagonist.”103   
 
Corroborating this claim is National Security Council paper NSC-68 from 1950, 
which states quite plainly that despite the obvious threat that the U.S.S.R. could pose 
to U.S. interests it actually played little role in America’s decision to expand its 
presence in the world.104  However, what the souring of relations with the Soviet 
Union did do for America was provide it with a reasonable excuse for this extension 
of power.105  This was particularly the case for America’s new claims on the Middle 
East. 
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As Truman era State Department official Joseph Jones explains, in the 
aftermath of World War II the British were no longer strong enough to project their 
power into the Mediterranean and Middle East in any substantial way.106  Thus, when 
Greece and Turkey made simultaneous pleas for assistance against encroaching 
communist threats, America found itself suddenly in a position to take up Britain’s 
responsibilities.107  Of course, as Layne discusses below, for the United States this 
was not at all seen as a problem because it was already predisposed to the idea of 
doing so: 
In 1946-1947 America’s growing involvement in the eastern Mediterranean and 
the Middle East was driven both by its interest in Middle Eastern Oil and by its 
fears of the Soviet Union.  Distrust of Soviet intentions led the United States to 
establish a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean (in fall 1946) and, in 
1947, to provide military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey.  
Moreover, as U.S.-Soviet tensions escalated, the Middle East assumed a growing 
military importance as a base to wage a strategic bombing campaign against the 
Soviet Union in the event of war.  Nevertheless, even without the Soviet threat, 
the United States almost certainly would have been drawn into these areas.  
America’s regional strategic objectives – gaining control over Middle Eastern and 
Persian Gulf oil, and establishing the United States (at Britain’s expense) as the 
region’s dominant power – were fixed during World War II, well before U.S. 
policy makers became concerned about the Soviet threat.108 
 
According to Robert Jervis, however, during the Truman administrations planning 
for this new regional policy “Proponents of aid to Greece and Turkey felt that the 
program would be politically acceptable only if it were justified in dramatic and far-
reaching terms.”109  Most understood that there was the very real possibility that the 
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Soviets might view such involvement so close to their borders as a provocation.110  
Hence, the American people would have to be firmly convinced that what was taking 
place was not simply an unnecessarily risky move toward imperialistic tendencies.  
And this, of course, would not be possible without the use of rather spectacular 
rhetorical maneuvering.   
 The reason for this is that even those who were planning the 
administration’s strategy plainly realized that the United States was, in fact, taking 
over for the British Empire’s as “world leader.”111  Nevertheless, despite this 
realization, as the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (SWNCC) made clear in 
one of its policy papers, the United States certainly did not want this takeover to be 
seen as such.112  The document argued “The only way we can sell the public on our 
new policy is by emphasizing the necessity of holding the line: communism vs. 
democracy should be the major theme.”113  It, therefore, proposed “We should 
couch it in terms of a new policy of this government to go to the assistance of free 
governments everywhere.”114  It similarly added “We should emphasize the idea of a 
common purpose with all democracies.”115  Hence, rather than being viewed as 
simply an attempt to move into the British Empire’s position, America’s actions 
could be seen by the public as a means of defending democratic values. 
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For those who doubted the pragmatism of acting in the world in this way, a 
novel line of logic was laid out.  As President Truman himself later stated in his 
famous Truman Doctrine speech, “This is no more than a frank recognition that 
totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, 
undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the 
United States.”116  In other words, what America’s leaders were trying say was that 
the protection of the democratic ideal in the world outside of America’s borders 
would guarantee that this outside world would never pose a threat to the safety of 
America’s democracy at home.  Thus, by protecting others, American’s would 
essentially be protecting itself. 
Not so coincidentally, it was also during this period that those pushing for 
domestic civil rights in America first began to experience some success.  Even during 
World War II “German and Japanese propagandists eagerly brandished every report 
of racial discrimination in the United States as evidence of American hypocrisy and 
the hollowness of Allied rhetoric about democracy and freedom.”117  But during the 
Cold War, America, which now claimed to be taking on the role of leader of the 
“free world,” found itself open to even more scrutiny.118  There was perhaps nothing 
more obvious for the Soviets to exploit.   
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By “Framing its foreign policy in terms of containing Soviet power and 
influence in order to promote and sustain a ‘free world,’ the Truman administration 
exposed itself to accusations of hypocrisy in an era of Jim Crow, colonialism, and 
apartheid.”119  Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Justice Department for the first time 
began to get involved in cases challenging things such as school segregation.120  
Though the famous Brown v. Board of Education case would not be decided until 
the Eisenhower administration had taken office, it was Truman’s Justice Department 
that began the battle over Jim Crow, and “The Justice Department’s most important 
brief in Brown itself was filed December 1952, during the last weeks of Truman’s 
presidency.”121  The bar had clearly been raised, and now America had little choice 
but to constantly give the impression that it was struggling to reach out and grasp it.   
Indeed, Truman had already desegregated the U.S. military by executive order 
a few years earlier.122  But he argued that if America was to inspire the rest of the 
world it would have to show signs that it was continuing to perfect its democracy.123  
In keeping with this, when the narrative of America’s democracy was threatened by 
the huge confrontation that broke out over school desegregation in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, Eisenhower, who, in fact, admitted he personally did not care for the idea 
of desegregation, decided to order a highly publicized dispatch of federal troops to 
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ensure the civil rights measure was carried out.124  The president had been made fully 
aware of the Soviet Union’s use of the incident for propaganda, as well as the 
massive news coverage it was receiving internationally, and he, therefore, understood 
all too well what sort of damage a lack of action could do to America’s democratic 
image.125          
The problem, of course, was that it was much more than America’s domestic 
racial issues alone that would come to make the world question its commitment to 
democratic values.  Indeed, during the Cold War, the United States was, 
unfortunately, quite notorious for lending support to autocratic regimes that actively 
suppressed democracy.126  As long as the leaders of these authoritarian governments 
claimed to be anti-communism, America seemed to believe that it had a legitimate 
excuse for allying itself with despotism.127  Ironically, this was perhaps nowhere truer 
than in the Middle East, one of the regions which had actually prompted Truman’s 
initial declaration that America would act internationally to protect democracy.  In 
fact, not only did the United States not protect democracy in this region, at times, it 
even worked to subvert it.   
For example, after America’s ally in Iran, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, 
was driven into exile in 1953, the C.I.A. did everything from planting propaganda to 
planting explosives in its bid to overthrow the democratically elected Iranian Prime 
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Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.128  Rather than applauding the flourishing of 
democratic values, the United States instead ignored the sovereignty of Iran and 
violently resisted what it alleged to be a Soviet conspiracy.  Though no one could 
accuse Mossadegh himself of being a communist, there were claims that his 
government’s willingness to form a coalition alliance with the Iran’s communist 
Tudeh Party would eventually lead to a pro-Soviet stance in the nation.129  And this, 
along with his decision to nationalize Iranian oil, of course, was seen as enough of a 
justification for him to be ousted in a CIA led coup.130   
Roots of the Rebuttal 
On the other hand, however, there was at least one case during the Cold War 
in which the United States did, in fact, fight on the side of freedom in the Muslim 
world.  In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini removed the Shah of Iran from power once 
again, and this time the United States could do little more than form a regional 
power-balancing coalition against the popular revolt.131  Nevertheless, just weeks 
later, Afghan mujahedeen forces were beginning a resistance of their own to repel an 
invasion from the Soviet Union, and anxious C.I.A. heads immediately began to 
develop plans to try to help hamper the efforts of the Soviet army.132  Naturally, even 
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in this case, though, America’s actions were not entirely altruistic.  From the very 
beginning, those with interests in the region were nervous about the sort of serious 
implications a Soviet move into Afghanistan could have.  For instance, in the 
American allied nation of Saudi Arabia, Prince  
Turki believed that the Soviet invasion signaled a drive by Moscow to establish 
strategic parity with the United Sates in the Middle East.  Until recently arms 
sales had been the communists’ primary calling card in the Arab world.  Now the 
Soviet Union was looking to gain more influence over oil prices and supplies.  
Occupying Afghanistan was not per se a Soviet objective, he concluded, but a 
step toward increasing its power in the region through proxy communist parties 
and leftist movements.133 
        
American officials agreed.134  There was already a general understanding that “The 
upheaval in Iran had created new vulnerabilities for the United States in the Middle 
East.”135  They, therefore, believed they had good reason to fear that “The KGB 
might seek to exploit this chaos.”136  To stave off the possibility of that occurring, a 
proposal was developed that suggested “A sustained rebellion in Afghanistan might 
constrain the Soviets’ ability to project power into Middle Eastern oil fields.”137  To 
help ensure the ferocity of this rebel insurgency, the U.S. decided to throw its weight 
behind the most radical Islamist forces in Afghanistan, believing they were the most 
determined to oppose the Soviet Union’s aggression.138  Likewise, 
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The United States supported efforts to recruit Muslims from around the world 
for the war to demonstrate the unity of Islamic opposition to the communist 
occupation of Muslim land, and to harness the religious fervor of those who 
viewed the battle as a holy war against invading infidels.139  
  
As fate would have it, Osama bin Laden just happened to be among those who were 
instrumental in organizing one of these programs.140   
Indeed, it was during his effort to recruit Muslims for the war against the 
Soviet Union that bin Laden first began to develop his media strategy.141  By utilizing 
the clout he had gained in Afghanistan from his own experience with combat, he 
skillfully persuaded other young Arabs that their presence in the fierce struggle 
against the Soviet onslaught was needed as well.142  Of course, it was not as if 
convincing others of the barbarity of the red army forces was all that difficult.143  
After all, in the name of emancipation and national security, they committed 
unspeakable atrocities against innocent non-combatants, many of whom could not 
have even found Moscow on a map, let alone pose a threat to it.144  Thus, the Soviets 
were essentially creating the mujahedeen on their own.145   
                                                 
139 James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, (New York: Fact On File, 2004), 246.  
 
140 Ibid. 
 
141 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion 
to September 11, 2001, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 163. 
 
142 Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An American Family in the American Century (New York: Penguin Books, 
2009), 302-303. 
 
143 Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, 
2nd ed. (Dulles, VA: Potamac Books, 2006). 26. 
   
144 Ibid. 
 
145 Ibid. 
 
  38 
Bin Laden, nevertheless, was quite good at telling the story of the struggle.146  
At one point, he would even begin to use the personal wealth he attained through 
inheritance to produce his own documentary films about the campaign.147  Years 
later, he would comment that he had come to believe that in matters of armed 
conflict the media war actually accounted for 90% of the necessary preparation for 
battle.148  He, thus, prided himself on what he claimed was his primary role in life, 
which was that of an instigator on behalf of the Islamic world.149  Ironically, though, 
despite the fact that bin Laden and the C.I.A. never had any direct connections with 
one another during the Soviet-Afghan war, since they were both working with many 
of the same people, his natural talent for instigation also worked quite successfully 
on behalf of U.S. interests as well.150   
For its part, the C.I.A. could have cared less about what gave the mujahedeen 
religious inspiration, just so long as the end result was bad for the Soviets.151  Indeed, 
although America’s support began as a covert operation, by 1983 U.S. officials were 
so proud of what they were accomplishing “President Reagan had begun to hint 
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openly that America was aiding the Afghan ‘freedom fighters.’”152  But this love affair 
was not to last forever.  In February of 1989, the battered Soviet army was forced to 
begin withdrawing its troops from Afghan soil.153  Not long afterward, the Soviet 
Union itself would collapse.154  Hence, with the communist threat greatly diminished, 
and U.S. interests seemingly secured, the United States abandoned both Afghan 
“freedom fighters” and civilians alike to the task of dealing with the war’s chaotic 
aftermath on their own.155   
Obviously, however, with the Cold War ended, citing the Soviet threat would 
no longer be a feasible means of rationalizing America’s future strategic actions in 
the world, a fact Bill Clinton would later be noted as lamenting over during the 
tenure of his presidency.156  Nonetheless, America’s pattern of supporting political 
suppression in the Muslim world continued on from that point essentially unaltered 
even without the Soviet Union.157  Confronted by the new geo-political landscape, 
the authoritarian regimes the United States allied itself with simply switched from 
legitimizing their tyranny with claims of being anticommunist to instead emphasizing 
their opposition to the rising wave of anti-Western Islamist radicalism158  The minor 
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adjustment in terminology hardly even qualified the change in the routine rhetoric as 
mentionable at all.  Then, the attacks of September 11, 2001 occurred.  
America’s Fall from Grace 
In the wake of the horrors of 9/11, America’s rhetorical support of 
democracy over the evils of tyranny experienced an almost messianic revival that 
gave it a tone perhaps more suitable for religion than for international politics.159  
After “Attributing the terrorist threat to the United States to the failure of 
democracy to take root in the Middle East, President Bush committed the United 
States to ‘a forward strategy of freedom in that region.’”160  He, therefore, created a 
missionary like plan for exporting democracy to nations abroad, adamantly insisting, 
just as Truman had before him, that doing so was vital to U.S. security.161  
Nevertheless, regardless of its zealous rhetoric, few in the Muslim world seemed to 
believe the Bush administration’s commitment to democracy was any different than 
that of the administrations that had come before it.   
Indeed, polls conducted during Bush’s time as president show that despite 
his repeated claims that he intended to bring democracy to the region, virtually no 
Muslim majority country accepted that to be the case.162  For one thing, many 
Muslims felt that Bush administration officials only began to emphasize calls for 
democracy after the invasion of Iraq failed to turn up weapons of mass 
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destruction.163  They also believed that even then the administration only did so 
because it initially thought it would be able to orchestrate a victory for its handpicked 
candidate, Ahmed Chalabi.164  They similarly questioned America’s refusal to 
recognize the Hamas government in the Palestinian territories after its clear victory 
in free and fair democratic elections. 165  And then, of course, there were the scandals 
such as the one at Abu Ghraib.166     
In spite of America’s relationship with regimes known for using brutal 
methods of torture to suppress political dissent, the United States had historically 
been relatively successful at maintaining the perception that it was itself unwilling to 
use such tactics.167  Though America’s guilt by association surely tarnished its nice 
image, and clearly caused more than a few to harbor an exceedingly deep antipathy 
for the country, it was still, despite its obvious inconsistencies, largely able to at least 
benefit from the advantages of plausible deniability.  That would all quickly change, 
though, when reports about U.S. personnel abusing inmates at the Abu Ghraib 
prison began to surface.  America’s liberal narrative suddenly began to completely 
unravel.  Indeed, 
It is precisely because the West in general, and the United States in particular, is 
seen as having “a fair judicial system,” as giving its “own citizens many liberties,” 
and portraying itself as champion of human rights that U.S. actions toward 
Muslims, such as those at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and other abuses are seen as 
so hypocritical.  
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One U.S. diplomat who was in Egypt when the Abu Ghraib scandal broke 
out said she was told by the locals: “We would expect this from our own 
government, but not from you.”  Ironically, it may be because of America’s 
idealized image as a beacon for democracy in the Muslim world that its actions 
elicit such passionate anger.168   
 
In other words, America’s fall from grace in the eyes of average Muslims was, in fact, 
more dramatic than it may have been otherwise due to the hypocrisy of its lofty 
liberal rhetoric.  Its grandiose narrative, when compared with its real world actions, 
made its offenses only seem all the more deplorable.   
As journalist Philip Kennicott explained following an interview with two men 
in Egypt not long after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, “Both return again and again 
to American hypocrisy as a central theme, perhaps even more important than all the 
other, more tangible crimes of America.”169  Similarly, when they assessed the crisis, 
communication specialists Steven Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall, 
would write “How could a nation devoted to justice, liberty, and the fair and humane 
treatment of prisoners of war and the legal protections guaranteed by our Bill of 
Rights sanctions the mistreatment, illegal detainment, and abuse of foreign citizens?  
In terms of world opinion, our arrogance was only matched by our hypocrisy.”170  
Hence, rather than making the United States more secure, it would seem that the 
Bush administration’s attempt to boost America’s democracy credentials, while 
essentially maintaining an unaltered course for the nation, only made the country 
more hated. 
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 Indeed, as Corman, Trethewey and Goodall observed, “From September 
2001 until October 2005, the Pew Center’s reports on the image of the U.S. fell 
dramatically, achieving by the Summer of 2007 the lowest recorded rating in our 
history.”171  Quite obviously, in terms of its diplomacy, the Bush administration was 
simply headed in the wrong direction.172  To help get things on the right track, the 
communications trio suggested that “To regain trustworthiness, there must be 
absolute consistency and alignment between what the U.S. does and what is says, even 
if audiences do not like what we are doing or saying [italics added].  Above all, it must be 
predictable in this way.”173  Just as the Defense Science Board had done in 2004, they 
argued “Lack of credibility is the key U.S. problem in our efforts to resist terrorist 
ideology.  It limits our persuasive power and provides our enemies the means to 
easily discredit virtually any message we produce – even true and right ones.”174  Yet, 
once again, it appears no one was truly willing heed such a warning.   
The work of Cormann and his associates gained attention from the State 
Department, the Department of Defense, and the Special Operations Command.175  
But, nevertheless, America still persisted down the same path.  The liberal rhetoric 
continued.  And so did the hypocrisy.     
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Minarets of War    
For Osama bin Laden, of course, this only meant continued success over the 
United States.  The nation’s hypocrisy, as Scheuer has pointed out, is, in fact, what he 
thrived on.  It was as if each instance of it became a towering minaret calling 
America’s enemies in on itself.  Some before him, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, had 
made the mistake of focusing too heavily on what they considered to be America’s 
moral depravity, but bin Laden realized early on that the secret to gaining advantage 
over the United States was concentrating on its political policies.176  He even devised 
a strategy for using the arrogant hypocrisy the U.S. displayed on the international 
stage to neutralize the charges of terrorism it laid against those who stood in 
opposition to it.  For example, in March of 1997 he declared,  
The US today, as a result of this arrogance, has set a double standard, calling 
whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist.  It wants to occupy our countries, 
steal our resources, install collaborators to rule us with man-made laws, and 
wants us to agree on all these issues.  If we refuse to do so, it will say we are 
terrorists.  With a fleeting glance at US behavior, we find that it judges the 
behavior of the poor Palestinian children whose country was occupied: if they 
throw stones against the Israeli occupation it says they are terrorists, whereas 
when the Israeli pilots bombed the United Nations building in Qana, Lebanon, 
while it was full of children and women, the US stopped any plan to condemn 
Israel.  At the same time that they condemn any Muslim who calls for his rights, 
they receive the highest official of the Irish Republican Army [Gerry Adams] at 
the White House as a political leader, while woe, all woe if the Muslims cry out 
for their rights.177    
  
He, likewise, used examples of American hypocrisy to call into question the country’s 
legitimacy as the self appointed non-proliferation police force of the Persian Gulf.  
Mirroring the earlier noted critique used by Mearsheimer and Walt, he would argue 
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“America accuses Iraq of using lethal weapons against the Kurds, against its own 
people.  It also accuses Iraq of using lethal weapons against Iran; however, what 
people should realize is that America was not accusing Iraq at the time, but rather 
was supporting it through various means and agents in the region.”178  Perhaps most 
damaging to America’s liberal rhetoric, however, was his critique of its record on 
democracy. 
 For instance, in October of 2002, just as the image of the U.S. was beginning 
to descend into its historic decline, bin Laden delivered a communiqué directed 
specifically at the United States.179  In this message, he set out to explain exactly why 
it was that he opposed the nation.180  At one point during his comments he stated 
“Let us not forget one of your major characteristics: your duality in both manners 
and values; your hypocrisy in manners and principles.  All manners, principles, and 
values have two scales: one for you and one for everybody else.”181  Not surprisingly, 
his first point of contention with American hypocrisy was with the stance the United 
States took on democracy.  As he explained, 
The freedom and democracy that you call for is for yourself and for the white 
race only; as for the rest of the world, you would impose upon it your 
monstrous, destructive policies and governments, which you call “friends of 
America”.  Yet you prevent them from establishing democracies.  When the 
Islamic party in Algeria wanted to practice democracy and they won the election, 
you unleashed your collaborators in the Algerian army on them, and attacked 
them with tanks and guns, imprisoned them and tortured them – a new lesson 
from the “American book of democracy”.182 
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Of course, as already noted, it would not be long after these statements that the Bush 
administration, seemingly courting disaster, would help to reinforce this argument, as 
well as set itself up for similar accusations of hypocrisy from others, when it decided 
to first encouraged free elections in the Palestinian territories only to later decline to 
recognize Hamas’ victory in them.183  Apparently willing to gamble with the 
possibility of endangering its entire rhetorical platform, the administration made a 
less than sincere push for Palestinian democracy when it clearly knew that the only 
democratic outcome it would be prepared to entirely embrace would be one in which 
Hamas’ opposition prevailed.  Naturally, when this wager failed to pan out and the 
United States was forced to show its hand, allegations that it had acted duplicitously 
quickly followed.  As a result, American popularity suffered, and those like bin 
Laden, whose work was once again essentially done for them, were handed another 
easy propaganda victory over the United States due to America’s almost inexplicable 
tendency to allow its overzealous liberal rhetoric to outpace its actual policy agenda.        
The Change That Never Came  
Amazingly, however, with the end of Bush’s occupancy of the presidency, 
the United States would actually be given an unexpected chance for redemption.  
With the warmly greeted election of Barack Obama in 2008, American leadership 
would suddenly receive a fairly significant boost in its approval rating in the Muslim 
world.184  Mr. “Obama’s initial efforts to bridge the U.S. and Muslim communities 
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around the world were seen as a hopeful beginning to improved relations.”185  
Moreover, as even Obama noted in his June 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt, much was 
made of the fact that the United States would elect an African American with a name 
such as his to be its president.186  Indeed, al-Qaeda apparently believed that the 
enthusiasm over this change in America’s face was so considerable that the 
organization would have to confront the issue head on.187  In a perhaps ill thought 
through attempt to do so, its deputy leader Aymin al-Zawahiri addressed the 
situation by describing Mr. Obama as a “house negro,” a term used by the late 
African-America Muslim leader Malcolm X to describe Blacks who bowed to White 
interests.188   
Nevertheless, regardless of how beset with anxiety al-Qaeda’s leadership may 
have been in the early days after Obama’s election, it would certainly have little 
reason to be so for very long.  Obama’s popularity would not be everlastingly.  In 
fact, by 2010, the approval rating gains his presidency brought about had already 
largely been erased.189  Apparently, it did not take much time for the Muslim world to 
move passed its initial enchantment.   
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In reality, though, this rapid transition should have been rather expected.  In 
his speech in Cairo, Obama himself noted that, despite social barriers, a number of 
Muslim nations had elected female heads of state to lead their countries.190  Yet, the 
isolated achievements of these particular women clearly had not meant that 
inequality, gender or otherwise, had disappeared under their rule.  So there was no 
reason to assume that Muslims, who were fully aware of this, would believe for any 
extended period that the election of a single individual, who just so happened to 
have been able to use his personal charisma to transcend America’s racial barriers, 
meant that things in the United States had really changed.  Indeed, since there had 
been no evidence to indicate a substantial improvement in the lives of African 
Americans since his election, it would have been quite foolish for them to continue 
thinking his presence in the White House would somehow mean there would be a 
swift change in their lives either.       
But, of course, it was not Obama’s personal history alone that inspired hope.  
As already noted, there was also the optimism his words encouraged.  For example, 
when he gave his address in Egypt he stated “I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new 
beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on 
mutual interest and mutual respect and one based upon the truth that America and 
Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.”191  He then went on to say, 
America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would 
not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election.  But I do have an 
unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your 
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mind and have a say in how you are governed, confidence in the rule of law and 
the equal administration of justice, government that is transparent and doesn’t 
steal from the people, the freedom to live as you choose.  These are not just 
American ideas, they are human rights.  And that is why we will support them 
everywhere.192 
 
Nevertheless, despite these flowery words, the new beginning Obama spoke of never 
seemed to actually materialize.  He raised people’s hopes, but his administration was 
apparently unable, or unwilling, to follow through.  And, thus, its ratings quite 
understandably fell rather precipitously.   
Soon, though, the administration would receive an unforeseeable chance to 
turn things around.  Change, entirely independent of it, was beginning to brew in the 
Middle East, and a historic opportunity to genuinely support democracy in the world 
would be laid before America’s feet.  In fact, all the United States would have to do 
is simply turn its back on those acting against its own democratic values.  Instead, 
however, as shall be seen, the Obama White House would choose the path of 
political ambiguity.  And in doing so, it would find not the way to recovery, but 
rather to further accusations of American hypocrisy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANXIOUS AMBIGUITY 
When protests against President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali broke out in 
Tunisia in late 2010, none with any sort of knowledge about the history of the nation 
should have been shocked by nature of the people’s grievances.  After all, they were, 
in fact, quite similar to those that brought Ben Ali himself to power decades 
earlier.193  His predecessor, “Habib Bourguiba, the ‘Great Combatant’ of Tunisia’s 
nationalist struggle, ruled a unified, one-party political state for more than thirty 
years.”194  During that time, Bourguiba would be made notorious for his brutal 
crackdowns against any and all political opposition to his power.195  Though there 
would be a brief period in the early 1980s in which Bourguiba would liberalize the 
political system somewhat, such toleration for dissent would not last long.196  Indeed, 
“In later life he had exiled his wife, son, and prime minister.”197 Clearly, none were 
immune. 
In spite of all this, though, Bourguiba was still quite successful at currying 
favor with the West because “More than any other Muslim ruler except Turkey’s 
Ataturk, who established a totally secular state, Bourguiba set Tunisia upon a path of 
modernization which was decidedly pro-Western and secular, becoming a valued 
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friend of both France and the United States.”198  Regardless of Bourguiba’s close 
relations with powerful Western countries, however, the economic and political 
stagnation brought about by his complete centralization of power would eventually 
prove disastrous for Tunisia.199  It was clear that reforms were needed, yet 
Bourguiba’s all encompassing character stood in the way of those reforms being 
implemented.200  Then, on November 7, 1987, he would be removed from power 
altogether in a bloodless coup led by his newly elected prime minister, Ben Ali.201 
Early on, this change in presidency was met with a great deal of optimism.202  
The new head of state set out a plan for both economic reform and political 
liberalization, and “For the first few years of his rule, Ben Ali’s strategy appeared 
superficially to be working.”203  Nonetheless, 
By 1997, ten years after the coup, it was clear that such optimism had been 
premature at best.  Reforms to the political system had ultimately been so 
restricted as to make genuine political competition impossible.  The regime 
appeared unwilling to consider real power-sharing and the secular opposition had 
proved unable to present an effective challenge.  The Islamist opposition, which 
had demonstrated its capacity to do so, had been not only excluded from official 
political space but had been subjected to a ruthless campaign of annihilation, 
along with leftist and trade union opposition to the regime and its policies.204 
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At the same time, “Ben Ali’s family was also unusually personalist and predatory in 
its corruption.”205  Indeed, “As the whistleblower Web site WikiLeaks recently 
revealed, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia reported in 2006 that more than half of 
Tunisia’s commercial elites were personally related to Ben Ali through his three adult 
children, seven siblings, and second wife’s ten brothers and sisters.”206  Apparently, 
for Ben Ali, the fall of Bourguiba meant little more than an opportunity for the rise 
of a new dynasty.   
 That dynasty’s power, however, would abruptly begin to collapse when a 
simple Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze on 
December 17, 2010.207  The 26 year old merchant had actually carried out his act of 
self immolation as the result of his own personal despair following an incident in 
which he was humiliated by policemen who confiscated his fruit cart.208  
Nevertheless, the story of what he did that day would ultimately result in the spread 
of anti-government protests across the entire nation.209  Seemingly out of nowhere, a 
revolution had begun.   
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The Western Response   
As would be expected, though, a crackdown would eventually follow.210  The 
government, claiming those in the crowds were violent extremists, began using live 
ammunition and several protesters were killed.211  Nonetheless, it soon became 
apparent that the regime’s security apparatus would not be able to contain the 
growing demonstrations.212  The unrest had gone on for weeks, yet the strife in the 
nation only seemed to be getting more intense.213  In response to this downward 
spiral, France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy offered to provide Tunisia’s leader with 
advisors to help train his forces in riot control.214  The French also, according to 
reports, approved the export of police equipment and crowd control devices.215  
Unfortunately for Ben Ali, however, this assistance would not come soon enough.  
Just days after Sarkozy extended his offer to send trainers, the long standing Tunisian 
dictator would be forced to abdicate power and flee his country.216  
Notably, regardless of what one may think of the questionable actions of the 
French, it would not be until after Ben Ali’s departure that the Obama 
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administration seemed prepared to weigh in on the Tunisian situation at all.  Indeed, 
when asked about the issue during a January 11th interview with the Dubai based 
news channel al-Arabiya, Secretary Clinton stated outright that the United States 
actually did not want to be seen as taking sides.217  In spite of this, though, by January 
14th, the same day Ben Ali just happened to begin his exile, President Obama quickly 
reversed this stance and declared 
I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing 
their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian 
people.  The United States stands with the entire international community in 
bearing witness to this brave and determined struggle for the universal rights that 
we must all uphold, and we will long remember the images of the Tunisian 
people seeking to make their voices heard.  I urge all parties to maintain calm and 
avoid violence and call on the Tunisian Government to respect human rights and 
hold free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and 
aspirations of the Tunisian people.218 
 
Apparently, Mr. Obama, now no longer having to guess who the victor would be in 
this struggle for political change, suddenly felt comfortable standing up for the 
democratic values he spoke so eloquently about in Cairo, Egypt two years earlier.  
Unfortunately, what he seemed to not understand was that showing support for the 
people only after they had accomplished their goals on their own would be seen by 
many in the Muslim world as essentially no different than showing no support at 
all.219  In fact, if anything, all it likely did in the minds of most was add an element of 
hypocrisy to what was widely seen as an already disappointing performance. 
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Hard to Let Go 
What was perhaps more problematic, though, was the speed with which the 
White House would begin to waiver from its new position.  During his January 25th 
State of the Union address, President Obama both praised the Tunisian people for 
their victory over a man whom he called a “dictator” and declared that the United 
States would support the democratic aspirations of people all over the world.220  
Meanwhile, nonetheless, as pro-democracy protests began to spread from Tunisia to 
Egypt on that exact same day, the administration seemed unsure of how to 
proceed.221  One obvious problem, of course, was that unlike the situation in 
Tunisian, in which the Obama administration had been able to stay mostly silent 
until the end of the political strife, the administration would now be expected to take 
a position from the very beginning.  
Indeed, the press would start to question Secretary Clinton about the 
Egyptian protests on the 25th itself.  Apparently trying to be politically cautious, 
however, Mrs. Clinton would reply by stating 
We support the fundamental right of expression and assembly for all people, and 
we urge that all parties exercise restraint and refrain from violence.  But our 
assessment is that the Egyptian Government is stable and is looking for ways to 
respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.”222  
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Unfortunately for the secretary of state, this comment did not go over well with the 
protestors.  Instead, it would actually come to be the specific cause of widespread 
criticism of her.223  In fact, even months later, Egyptians would continue to cite it as 
grounds for bitter resentment.224  Of course, no one objected to her endorsement of 
the right of expression and assembly.  But, rather than trying to be responsive to 
those who had assembled to express themselves, the so-called stable government of 
Egypt had, in reality, simply been attacking the crowds, and Secretary Clinton’s 
allusion to the contrary only enraged the demonstrators more.225        
Still, one could hardly point to Clinton as the sole U.S. official making the 
kind of statements that would open the administration up to harsh critique.  Indeed, 
if her remarks were of the sort to lead large numbers of Egyptians to suspect that the 
United States was putting its interests before its professed values, those of Vice 
President Joe Biden almost certainly convinced them that this was the case beyond 
any doubt.  For instance, when asked during an interview with Jim Lehrer on the 
PBS Newshour if he believed Hosni Mubarak, the long standing head state in Egypt, 
should be seen as a dictator, the vice president replied  
Look, Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things and he’s been very 
responsible on, relative to geopolitical interests in the region: Middle East peace 
efforts, the actions Egypt has taken relative to normalizing the relationship with 
Israel.  And I think -- I would not refer to him as a dictator.”226   
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It was reported some time afterward that Biden later claimed to regret making this 
statement.227  Nevertheless, regrets aside, Egyptians clearly had little reason to feel 
like America had any true commitment to democracy.  As Egyptian Nobel Laureate 
Mohamed Elbaradei complained during an interview with CBS’s Face the Nation, 
“You know, on one hand you’re talking about democracy, rule of law and human 
rights, and on the other hand you are lending support to a dictator that continues to 
oppress his people.”228  Only a few days earlier, in his State of the Union address, 
Obama had spoken powerful words about democratic values and had even 
applauded the Tunisian people for their victory over dictatorial rule.  But now his 
administration, with its hesitance to let go of the status quo in Egypt, was making 
those words look like no more than brazen hypocrisy. 
Certainly, from a strategic point of view, though, America’s reluctance to 
jeopardize its comfortable relationship with Egypt’s authoritarian regime was 
completely understandable.  The upheaval in a peripheral nation such Tunisia was 
one thing.229  The destabilization of a regional linchpin like Egypt was something 
entirely different. 230  Long known as a leader in the Arab world, changes there could 
have effects on political, military, and religious trends far beyond its borders.231   
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Moreover, as Vice President Biden pointed out, the Egyptian government 
under Hosni Mubarak in particular had been vital to securing America’s geopolitical 
interests.  Not only had Mubarak been willing to go against the regional tide in his 
support of Israel, but he had also been extremely vigilant in the suppression of 
terrorism.232  If he were to depart from his position of power, there would be no way 
of knowing for sure if his replacement would be anywhere near as accommodating.  
After all, not so long before, the relationship between the United States and one of 
Egypt’s former heads of state was actually quite hostile.  In fact, it is only by 
understanding the history of America’s struggle with former Egyptian president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser that one can fully understand the true origins of America’s 
current cause for anxieties in the region.  As shall be shown below, Nasser’s 
ideological impact would set in motion a series of pro-U.S.-interests countermeasures 
that would in the end come back to haunt the United States for years to come. 
Conflicting Narratives    
Even with the most drastic of measures, however, dislodging Nasser from 
power would surely not be easy.  Versions of the socialist brand of Arab nationalism 
he and his fellow “Free Officers” endorsed after seizing authority in the Egyptian 
coup of 1952 had quickly sprung up not only in Egypt, but also in Algeria, Libya, 
Sudan, Syria and Iraq as well.233  Hence, the struggle against Egypt’s president was, in 
fact, a struggle against an entire regional movement.  Nasser’s personal charisma 
driven rise in popularity during the mid 1950s may have made him the most 
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influential leader in that movement, but he certainly was not alone in his way of 
thinking.234  All of the nations mentioned shared a similar worldview, and all of them 
promoted an ideological narrative that challenged the previous order: 
They indicted European imperialism for its invasion and occupation, as well as 
its policies which divided by creating states and drawing artificial national 
boundaries, thus debilitating the Arab and Muslim world.  They espoused a 
continuing struggle against colonialism, exacerbated by the West’s role in the 
creation and support of a Western colony, Israel, in the Arab homeland, and 
denounced the failures of the traditional Arab political leadership and its Western 
liberal nationalism.  They condemned the radical individualism of capitalism, 
called for Arab unity and solidarity, and promised the creation of a new social 
order to alleviate the plight of the masses of Arab societies.235 
   
Yet, what was clearly most distressing for America and its allies in the area was 
Nasser’s claim that the region’s oil reserves belonged not to local monarchies, but 
rather to the Arab people as a whole.236  Only adding to this sense of anxiety was the 
fact that Nasser had developed an extremely friendly relationship with America’s key 
rival, the Soviet Union.237  If the Soviets were able to gain control of Middle Eastern 
oilfields through their relationship with Nasser, it could prove to be devastating for 
America’s global strategy.238  Clearly, something had to be done.   
To help in its bid to challenge Nasser’s influence, the U.S. looked to one of 
its closest friends, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, to stand as its leading regional anti-
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communist ally.239  According to Hermann Eilts, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia, “The Eisenhower administration had the idea that perhaps King Saud could 
be built up in a political fashion that might make him a contender with Nasser in 
terms of leadership in the Arab world.”240  Certainly, the partnership looked as if it 
made perfect sense.  The Saudi royal family undoubtedly had their own reasons for 
opposing a socialization of their kingdom’s natural resources, and “They were also 
threatened by Arab socialism’s populist critique of the ‘feudalism’ of conservative 
Arab monarchies and its support for their overthrow.”241  Unfortunately for 
America, though, King Saud lacked many of the qualities necessary to make such a 
strategy work.242   
For one thing, Saud was notorious for allowing his love of Western 
indulgences to hamper his ability to manage the kingdom’s finances.243  He was also 
rather well known to have a fairly serious drinking problem.244  Worst of all, 
however, was the fact that his lack of leadership skills prevented him from being able 
to reassure even the members of his own family that he could be a competent 
steward of affairs.245  As a result, his time as king would soon come to a sudden end 
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when he would be abruptly replaced by his much more respected brother Faisal in a 
bloodless transition of power initiated by the royal family itself.246   
  This unexpected transition, however, would actually prove to be quite 
advantageous for U.S. interests.  For it was under Faisal’s leadership that an Islamist 
counter-narrative came to be the antidote to that put forward by Nasser’s “un-
Islamic” socialist Pan-Arabism movement.247  Of course, it may be a bit unfair to say 
this trend was entirely a matter of political strategy.  But, it is hardly a secret today 
that “While Faysal had been socialised into Islamic education from an early age 
under the influence of his Al Shaykh maternal kin, his Islamic rhetoric came to the 
forefront mainly as a counter-discourse to current Arab political trends associated 
with Arab nationalism in both its Nasserite and Bacthist versions.”248  Likewise, it was 
obviously not America’s love of Islam that prompted its backing of this movement 
either.  Thus, even from its very inception, a degree of hypocrisy tainted the 
foundations of Faisal’s program of political Islamization.  
Regardless of his motivations, though, one thing that is for certain is Faisal 
would clearly demonstrate that he did not share in his brother deficiencies.  His plans 
would prove absolutely galvanizing in the Islamic world, and the Saudis, under his 
leadership, would exploit every means possible to keep up the pressure:   
They used their Islamic claims as keepers of Islam’s sacred cities of Mecca and 
Medina and protectors of the pilgrimage, and their oil wealth, to promote 
themselves as patrons of Islam and to encourage Muslim solidarity.  They created 
international Islamic organizations such as the World Muslim League (1966) and 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1969), through which they 
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distributed funds for the promotion and preservation of Islam (the building of 
mosques, schools, hospitals, and the printing and distribution of religious 
literature) and organized Muslim countries and institutions.249   
 
They even invited members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization which had 
been brutally suppressed by the Nasser regime, to come and take refuge in Saudi 
Arabia.250   
In the early days of Nasser’s time in power, the Brotherhood actually had 
relatively warm relations with the Egyptian government.251  The group had a militant 
fundamentalist orientation, but it shared in Nasser’s belief in the need for regional 
liberation.252  Nevertheless, over time, growing rivalries between the two opposing 
ideologies led to a break in ties and an all out open confrontation.253  It was then that 
Faisal, hoping to challenge Nasser’s legitimacy even further, welcomed them into the 
kingdom.254   
Once there, Brotherhood members were allowed to establish themselves in a 
wide range of fields such as business, Islamic banking, media, and higher 
education.255  The kingdom’s university system would be where the Brotherhood 
would attain its greatest foothold, however, due to the desperately poor condition it 
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was in upon their arrival.256  Taking full advantage of the situation, the Brotherhood 
used Saudi academic institutions to spread their own version of Islamist ideology.  
Ultimately, this would help to engender greater radicalization of Saudi society, and, 
thus, change its worldview.257  In fact, it would actually be a Brotherhood professor 
at bin Laden’s university who would first introduce the young Saudi to the ways of 
global of jihad.258 
Yet, despite the strong religious tones of Faisal’s project, “Its leitmotif was 
clearly not Islamic piety, for the pact included the Shah of Iran and Habib Bourguiba 
of Tunisia – men not particularly known for the observance of Islam.”259  
Furthermore, Faisal was also still receiving support from America as well.260  Looking 
back on America’s position in regards to these developments, David 
Long, a perceptive analyst with a strong sense of irony, says that despite the fact 
that it was glaringly obvious, most U.S. policy makers and analysts had little or 
no appreciation of the potentially explosive nature of the Islamic resurgence.  
“We didn’t see Islam.  We saw Saudi Arabia,” he says.  “Pan-Islam was not, to 
us, seen as a strategic threat.  There were bad guys doing bad things to people on 
the left, to Nasser.  They were fighting the pinkos.  So we didn’t see pan-Islam as 
a threat.” 261   
 
Long claims that during his time at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research he tried to warn of the possible dangers of this policy, “But there was 
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no market for it.”262  Apparently, few understood that elements within the Islamist 
movement they were supporting were just as anti-Western as they were anti-
communist.263  Soon, however, regional events would make signs of this more and 
more obvious. 
Blowback     
After the Israelis handed Egypt and other Arab nations an embarrassingly 
decisive defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, Nasser’s claim that Pan-Arab ideology was 
the solution to the issues confronting the Arab world largely came to be seen as 
discredited.264  Not only had these secular governments been ineffectual in dealing 
with domestic socio-economic problems, their armies had now been crushed and 
much territory, including east Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, had been 
lost.265  Many religious leaders reflecting on the defeat, often referred to in the region 
as the “disaster,” argued that it had, in reality, come about as the result of the Arab 
world’s deviation from the true path of Islam.266  The faithful had abandoned their 
faith, and now it was time for a return.267   
With the death of Nasser just three years after the Six Day War, the move 
away from Pan-Arab socialist activism would begin to proceed with even greater 
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momentum.268  Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat would not only initiate an active 
program of “de-Nasserization,” but would actually try to stabilize Egypt’s place 
internationally by becoming a rather strong ally of the United States.269  Likewise, to 
try to help secure his rather shaky place in power domestically, he would attempt to 
offset the influence of Egypt’s remaining Nasserites elements by heavily 
incorporating Islamic symbolism and taking on the title “The Believer President.”270  
As an added measure in this latter campaign, he would also ease restrictions on 
certain Islamic oriented organizations and allow Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood to 
once again have a degree of room for operation.271       
It would not be long, though, before the regional trend toward radical 
political Islam would begin to have disastrous unexpected consequences for those 
leaders endeavoring to use it for their personal advantage.  As already noted, 
“Muhammad Shah recognized the power and influence of Islam and tried to 
mobilize it in support of his autocracy.”272  But, in the 1979 Iranian Revolution he 
would find himself swept out of power by those such as Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
believed traditional Islamic values in Iran had, in truth, been trampled upon by the 
Shah and that these values could only be restored after his monarchy had been 
                                                 
268 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (1982; repr., New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1994), 323. 
 
269 Ibid., 323–324. 
 
270 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, rev. and updated 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 171. 
 
271 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (1982; repr., New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1994), 323. 
 
272 Ibid., 300. 
 
  66 
removed.273  Likewise, the Saudis were now finding that they had placed themselves 
in a rather difficult position as well.  King  
Faysal was responsible for promoting an Islamic world-view, together with an 
Islamic foreign policy, but both undermined his growing partnership with the 
United States and rendered the behavior of members of the royal family that 
deviated from Islam more problematic.  His Islamic policy was a double edged 
sword.  It enhanced Saudi Arabia’s position internally and internationally, but 
also invited criticism whenever the Islamic ideal was perceived to have been 
violated.274 
   
This tension came to a head when in November of 1979 Islam’s holiest mosque, 
located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, was seized by radical anti-Saud forces loyal to 
Juhayman ibn Muhammad al-Utaybi and Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani.275  
The rebellion would eventually be brutally put down.276  But, the members of the 
House of Saud were realizing just what sort of danger they had placed themselves in.  
Ironically, “The majority of Juhayman’s rebels had been students at the Islamic 
University of Medina, where the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s influence had been 
strong.”277  It seemed that Faisal’s tactical move to undermine Nasser’s rule was at 
this point beginning to undermine his own.   
Luckily for the royal family, however, the Soviet-Afghan war would be 
starting around that same time.  Along with many other Arab leaders, the Saudis, 
taking full advantage of the situation, happily exported scores of their restless young 
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Islamists to the Afghan warfront.278  Indeed, to help encourage these young men to 
go abroad and risk their lives, the Saudis began a campaign that taught that dying in a 
just war, such as the one in Afghanistan, should be the greatest aspiration of any 
Muslim.279  The hope, of course, was that these mujahedeen fighters would in fact die 
in the Afghan jihad and, thus, no longer pose a problem.280   
Meanwhile, Anwar Sadat would soon find himself face to face with another 
sort of jihad.  After their long persecution under Nasser, Egypt’s remaining Muslim 
Brotherhood members moved away from violence and attempted to work within the 
Egyptian system, concentrated mainly on helpful social programs and political 
reform.281  Nevertheless, “A new crop of secret revolutionary groups, some funded 
by disaffected and radicalized former Muslim Brothers who had been imprisoned 
under Nasser, began to challenge both what they regarded as Sadat’s hypocritical 
manipulation of Islam and the moderate posture of the Muslim Brotherhood.”282  
They, along with many others, were angered by Sadat’s alliance with the West, his 
signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel, and his decision to give support to 
the Shah of Iran.283  They, therefore, unwilling to follow the lead of the Brotherhood 
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any longer, made plans to remove Sadat from the scene by force.284  On October 6, 
1981, an opportunity to do so presented itself, and a group known as Jamaat al-Jihad 
assassinated Sadat as he oversaw the procession of military personnel during an 
annual parade.285 
In response to the assassination, Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, clamped 
down heavily on militant Islamist activity.286  His government increased the vigilance 
with which the nation’s security forces intervened in religious clashes and decisively 
crushed any riotous outbursts of violence.287  Nevertheless, while others, such as 
Tunisia’s Bourguiba, were at the same time launching operations to crush even 
moderate Islamist groups, Mubarak was careful to differentiate between reformists 
and more radical elements bent on violence.288  He was also noted for his attempts to 
bring about greater political liberalization in the nation in general.289  Though he 
plainly had no qualms about responding with full force against those that resorted to 
violence, his overall approach was one of relative tolerance.290   
Unfortunately for the Egyptian people, however, Mubarak’s tendency toward 
leniency would be short lived.  As time went on, the idea of openness to opposition 
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became far less acceptable, and the government began to charge that there was little 
difference between groups working within the system, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and those that engaged in outright terrorism.291  Islamists of all shades 
soon found that arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings were to be the new 
norm.292  Mubarak likewise extended his new heavy handed approach to non-
religious oriented dissenters as well, silencing the media, professional syndicates, and 
other elements of civil society. 293       
Holding Hands with the Devil 
  Thus, by the time the so called Arab Spring protests began some 30 years 
after Mubarak first became head of state, few Egyptians would have reason to 
lament his departure.  The political promise of his initial days in power had proven 
to be little more than a misleading mirage and, after decades of his rule, discontent 
among the Egyptian citizenry had been given more than enough time to boil over.  
Making matters worse, his economic policies were essentially bringing the nation’s 
underclasses to the brink of collapse and rumors that his son was quietly being 
groomed to take his place only led to the fear that the future would hold nothing but 
more of the same.294  Meanwhile, on the other hand, America’s political elite hardly 
had any reason to share in this sense of betrayal.  Mubarak may have been at times 
                                                 
291 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, rev. and updated 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 173. 
 
292 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 99. 
 
293 Ibid., 100. 
 
294 Dina Shehata, “The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End,” Foreign 
Affairs 90, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 27-29. 
 
  70 
accused of shrewdly orchestrating a narrative that presented the situation in Egypt as 
a choice between himself and Islamic fundamentalism.295  But those in America, 
whom he supposedly sold this tale to, were certainly not naïve novices to the ways of 
the world.  Hence, regardless of how cathartic doing so might be for America’s own 
sense of itself, it would be quite difficult to maintain, with any intellectual honesty, 
that he was truly fooling anyone with such a pretext. 
Clearly, Mubarak’s practices ran counter to America’s purported values.  But, 
“International politics, however, is not a morality play.”296  The Middle East has a 
great deal of strategic significance for the United States, and “When important 
geopolitical interests are on the line, realpolitik, not regime type, determines great 
power policies.”297  So,  
Although there are a lot of governments in that region with which it is distasteful 
to do business, the devil one knows is better than the devil one doesn’t.  And, 
unpalatable though it may be, a great deal of stability – or at least less instability – 
usually can be bought by dealing with nondemocratic regimes than by attempting 
to transform them.298       
 
Nonetheless, as the protests in Egypt persisted, it became increasingly unclear if 
Mubarak continued to have the capacity to guarantee the greatest degree of stability 
possible for U.S. interests.  Indeed, during his aforementioned interview, Elbaradei 
cautioned that the only way calm could be restored to the nation was if Mubarak, in 
fact, agreed to depart, and, as he explained, America’s inability to recognize this fact 
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was beginning to seriously ebb away at its own credibility.299  In the past, Mubarak’s 
iron fisted approach to maintaining order may have made him a valuable ally, but, as 
his hold on society began to slip, his brutal methods were simply becoming a liability.  
Nevertheless, despite attempts on the part of U.S. officials to publicly distance 
America from Mubarak’s policies, with the outcome of the demonstrations 
remaining uncertain, the Obama administration still appeared to be hesitant to 
entirely break with Mubarak’s government.      
 For instance, on January 28th, President Obama followed up Mubarak’s first 
televised address regarding the protests with a rather strategic public statement of his 
own.  In this speech, Obama subtly edged his administration away from Egypt’s 
ruling regime by recounting his appeal to the Egyptian leader to refrain from 
violence, restore full access to Egypt’s internet and mobile services, which Mubarak 
had apparently disconnected in an attempt to paralyze the protestor’s ability to 
communicate, and make good on the pledges made in his address to his people by 
providing Egyptians with tangible examples of change.300  Then, tying his remarks in 
with the broader vision he presented during his days of greater popularity, Obama 
closed by stating  
When I was in Cairo, shortly after I was elected President, I said that all 
governments must maintain power through consent, not coercion.  That is the 
single standard by which the people of Egypt will achieve the future they 
deserve.  Surely there will be difficult days to come.  But the United States will 
continue to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people and work with their 
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Government [sic] in pursuit of a future that is more just, more free, and more 
hopeful.301   
 
If that were not enough, only adding to the sense that his administration was now 
serious about supporting the Egyptian people’s democratic rights was the fact that 
just a few of hours earlier White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs announced 
“We [i.e. The Obama administration] will be reviewing our assistance posture based 
on events that take place in the coming days.”302  Nevertheless, when Elbaradei’s 
CBS interview was conducted a few days later he promptly pointed out that 
conditions were only growing worse, and that the time for cutting funding to the 
Mubarak regime had obviously arrived.303  Faced with what may have been an 
intentional call of its bluff, the administration, still unwilling to fully move away from 
it hedge position, was forced to allow America’s insincerity to once again be exposed.  
Despite the Obama administration’s symbolic statements of solidarity with those 
fighting for democracy, the Egyptian government’s funding would not be cut, and 
the Egyptian people would receive no more than slightly varied forms of the 
rhetorical repetition they had already been given. 
Naturally, such policies had very little chance of removing suspicions of U.S. 
duplicity.  The political game of back and forth America was playing had essentially 
left the United States in the same position it had begun in, and it was quickly 
becoming more and more apparent that the propaganda being issued by the Obama 
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administration was simply its way of trying to avoid fully alienating either side until it 
could be sure of who the ultimate victor would be.   Completely disenfranchised, one 
young Egyptian demonstrator declared “I don’t believe in America. They play with 
the -- the -- the, winner, not with the -- the people or with the power. The winner, 
USA will be with the winner.”304  And, unfortunately, for those Egyptian who may 
have hoped for U.S. assistance, it would still be some time before America would 
know who that winner would be.   
By February 1st, however, a victory for anti-Mubarak forces was beginning to 
seem increasingly likely.  The momentum behind the protest movement was showing 
no sign of decline and, with little choice but to make at least some sort of seemingly 
significant concession, President Mubarak announced that in recognition of the will 
of the people he would be stepping down from power after Egypt’s national 
elections, which were scheduled for September 2011.305  In spite of this offer, 
though, the Egyptian people, untrusting of Mubarak and angered by the idea of 
compromise, made it clear in the streets of Egypt that they were not satisfied.306  
They continued to demand that Mubarak step down immediately.307     
The Transition   
As one might expect, with it now being evident that Mubarak’s proposal 
would not be accepted, President Obama once again felt the need to try to frame 
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America’s position.  In yet another televised address designed to make public his call 
to the Egyptian leader to be responsive to the people of Egypt, Obama stated “What 
is clear – and what I indicated tonight to President Mubarak – is my belief that an 
orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”308  
By the tone of his performance, the president appeared to want to express a sense of 
both decisiveness and resolve.  Likewise, his decision to once more make a statement 
so quickly after Mubarak’s own may have been intended to help heighten a feel of 
urgency.  Nevertheless, as was even pointed out in the American media, it was hard 
to overlook the fact that the phrasing Obama chose to discuss the time frame for the 
transition seemed “deliberately vague.”309  To be sure, endorsing the cause of positive 
change is always a commendable thing to do.  But the president scarcely could have 
missed that a “transition” that “must begin now” could start immediately and yet last 
for decades.     
 Meanwhile, as America’s position remained quite questionable, it was the 
outlawed Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was left to stand up for the 
protesters in Egypt’s Tahrir Square when pro-Mubarak forces, allegedly sent in by 
the regime itself, attacked the crowds for two days.310  The square had become the 
symbolic focal point of Egypt’s revolution.311  But, on February 2nd, it became a 
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virtual battleground as men wielding clubs, knives, and firebombs poured into the 
area to assault the ill prepared demonstrators.312  Initially, the anti-Mubarak forces 
tried to avoid being pulled into the violent bout.313  It eventually became clear, 
though, that the assailants would not relent.  Ironically, the Brotherhood’s senior 
leadership was at first slow to get involved with the protest at all. 314  But now, after 
doing so, they suddenly found that the responsibility to stand on the frontlines to 
protect the demonstrators in this unexpected urban battle would fall on the soldiers 
of young men from their organization.315   
During his February 1st address, President Obama had praised the Egyptian 
army for both allowing demonstrations to continue and serving as protector of those 
involved.316  The army, unlike the Egyptian police force, which had itself brutally 
attacked the crowds, vowed after being deployed into the streets not to use force on 
those peacefully voicing their dissent.317  Nevertheless, when the demonstrators 
found themselves being violently intimidated by Mubarak sympathizers, military 
forces stationed in the square merely stood by and watched the bloodshed unfold.318  
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Thus, by virtue of the military’s inaction, the people were now essentially being 
abandoned to rely on the Brotherhood.      
For its part, the White House did not even seem to be willing to use any 
serious diplomatic pressure to help the situation.  In his official release concerning 
the melee, Press Secretary Gibbs simply stated “The United States deplores and 
condemns the violence that is taking place in Egypt, and we are deeply concerned 
about attacks on the media and peaceful demonstrators.  We repeat our strong call 
for restraint.”319  Notably, however, there would be no subsequent demands on 
Mubarak to personally see to it that the people were protected.  Nor would there be 
any threats of withholding aid if he did not immediately do so.  Once again, the 
United States appeared unready to move away from the sidelines.  
In the end, though, those in Tahrir would prove themselves able to persevere 
through the two day confrontation even without the assistance of outside forces.  
Through their determination, they independently demonstrated that their revolution 
was far from over.  America’s chance to place itself on the right side of history in 
their eyes, however, may have been.  As Journalist Nicholas Kristof later reported,  
To many Egyptians, the U.S. is conspiring with the regime to push only cosmetic 
reforms while keeping the basic structure in power.  That’s creating profound ill 
will.  In Tahrir Square, I watched as young people predisposed to admire 
America – the Facebook generation – expressed a growing sense of betrayal.  In 
a country where half the population is under 24, we are burning our bridges.”320   
 
And, surely, there was good reason for the resentment. 
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Though it was perhaps not entirely clear to many in the American audience, the 
violence in Egypt was quite significant.  As Kristof would go on to explain,          
Human Rights Watch has confirmed 302 deaths in the Egypt upheavals, based 
on visits to hospitals in three cities, and says the real toll may be significantly 
higher.  To put that in perspective, that is several times the toll when Iran 
crushed its pro-democracy movement in 2009.  And it’s approaching the toll 
when the Chinese Army opened fire on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing in 
1989.  Yet when it’s our ally that does the killing, we counsel stability, gradualism 
and order. 
These are Egypt’s problems to work out, not America’s.  But whatever 
message we’re trying to send, the one that is coming through is that we continue 
to embrace the existing order, and that could taint our future relations with 
Egypt for many years to come.”321   
 
Regrettably, when all was said and done, it would be revealed that the situation in 
Egypt was, in fact, much worse than Kristof had originally reported.  Indeed, the 
figures he quoted would not even amount to half of the ending death toll.  
According to final tallies, during the 18 days the protests lasted, over 800 people lost 
their lives.322  Ultimately, however, it could at least be said that those lives were not 
lost in vain. 
The End of an Era? 
After making one last attempt on February 10th to calm the unrest with 
another televised address, President Mubarak finally chose to accept the inevitable 
and abdicate his position as head of state.323  In his initial announcement, he, in 
addition to delegating certain authorities to his vice president, once again tried to 
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reassure the people he would be stepping down after the elections in September.324  
But, when the crowds realized he would not be immediately resigning, as many 
expected him to do during the speech, the people were thrown into a fury.325   
Indeed, there was the fear that the following day immeasurable violence would 
erupt.326  As Mohamed Elbaradei explained, the nation was on the verge of 
exploding.327  If Mubarak had not stepped down, the situation possibly could have 
descended into an all out war.   
Fortunately, such a disaster was averted.  After decades in power, Mubarak’s 
long reign came to an abrupt end.  The Egyptian army took control of the nation.328  
And the people of Egypt won a powerful symbolic victory.  
With the struggle now over, President Obama, at this point no longer unsure 
of which side would ultimately prevail, ceremoniously congratulated the 
demonstrators on their triumph.329  Just as the young Egyptian protestor predicted, 
he was finally prepared to shake free from ambiguity and declare that the “USA” was 
“with the winner.”330  Of course, Mubarak’s fate was not even an issue of discussion.  
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The Egyptian leader may have been viewed as a close friend of the United States 
while it was reasonably clear he was America’s best strategic option.  But, once he 
unequivocally proved not to be, the White house had no problem quickly severing all 
allegiance.  As explained earlier, America’s primary concern is stability.  And 
unfortunately for Mubarak, as the former president of Liberia Samuel Doe would 
have likely told him, – if Doe were able speak from the grave – once a dictator loses 
his utility in securing U.S. objectives he is no longer of any interest to America.331   
Certainly only adding to the administration’s comfort with the transition was 
the already mentioned fact that it was, in reality, the Egyptian military that took 
control of the nation, not the protestors.  Since the United States has long had 
relatively close ties with Egypt’s military, which it had given billions of dollars to over 
the years, the administration could basically feel fairly confident that America’s 
interests would remain at least somewhat secure even without Mubarak.332  Indeed, it 
was possible that things would actually not change at all.  These new circumstances, 
however, were clearly not entirely unproblematic.   
The army, being seen as somewhat removed from the Mubarak regime, was 
still a well respected institution in Egypt, and with its numbers being largely made up 
of conscripts, it enjoyed a special connection with nearly every Egyptian family.333  
During the protests, anti-Mubarak demonstrators were even known to chant “the 
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army and the people are one.”334  Nevertheless, cracks in this relationship suddenly 
began to surface during the Tahrir Square incident in which the army essentially took 
on the role of spectator while protestors were brutally assaulted for two days.  A 
subsequent investigation carried out by Egypt’s new authorities charged that the 
actual orchestration of the violence was, in fact, conducted by close allies of 
President Mubarak.335  Still, many of the protestors felt extremely betrayed by the 
army’s inaction.  Indeed, after a number of those in the square realized they would 
have to face the onslaught wholly on their own, their desperate pleas to the army for 
protection eventually turned to bitter condemnation.336   
There would also be further, and much more serious, complaints after 
Mubarak’s resignation.  Under the rule of the former regime, acts of torture by the 
Egyptian police force were considered rather routine.337  Once the army took lead of 
the nation, however, many began to allege that such domestic human rights abuses 
had quickly become the calling card of the military as well.338  Mubarak the man may 
have departed, but apparently “Mubarakism” had not.339   
Naturally, the uneasy post-Mubarak environment in Egypt left plenty of 
room for al-Qaeda to try and insert itself into the nation’s political discourse, and bin 
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Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri was clearly well suited to lead such a charge.  
Zawahiri, as a former member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was intimately 
familiar with both the country’s history and just how brutal the repression could be 
in the nation.340  He, therefore, had special insight into many of the fears the 
Egyptian people were confronting.  And, as one would only expect, he attempted to 
use those fears to stir up apprehensiveness toward America.   
In fact, even in earlier comments, Zawahiri made every effort to call 
America’s diplomatic position on the Egyptian revolution into question.  For 
instance, after Mubarak’s grip on power began to look somewhat unsure, Zawahiri 
argued 
America is watching the situation and is issuing vague statements; so if Mubarak 
becomes able to control the situation using murder, suppression and 
displacement, then that would be what America wanted from the biggest Zionist 
Arab, who has allowed the abuse of Egypt, it ports, airports and the Suez Canal, 
which for that he suppressed the Islamic movement, and for which he juices up 
the prisoners via the American-supervised refinery of retrogressions, so they can 
come out as disfigured creatures and ugly beasts who would praise their torturers 
and who would revolt against their own principles. 
 He is the one who is sanctioning Gaza, and he…protected the southern 
Israeli borders and has emptied Sinai from weapons for its sake, and instead he 
has turned it into a beacon for Israel prostitution trade.  And America until now 
remains watching and following up, and it is holding the stick from the middle, 
with its full knowledge of Mubarak’s crimes and that he would be the last one to 
implement any American measures of democracy.  But she [America] has a grasp 
of him because he is the biggest Arab Zionist and protector of her interests and 
guarantor of the continuation of her crimes against Islam and Muslims. 
 And what Mubarak has offered until today of dissolving the government and 
appointing his representative and promises of reforms, does not solve anything 
and that does not extinguish the flames of popular outrage, which demands his 
fall because he is the main criminal….America…tries to gain time so that 
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Mubarak may be able to control the situation so her interests and crimes can 
continue.341 
 
Of course, as already illustrated, much of what Zawahiri had to say about America’s 
lack of decisiveness had already been criticized either by average Egyptians or more 
prominent figures such as Mohamed Elbaradei.  In fact, the suspicion that the 
United States was essentially just trying to hold onto the status quo was even 
expressed by American writers such as Kristof.  Thus, Zawahiri was clearly doing the 
revolution itself no major service by pointing this out again.  What making these 
sorts of statements did for al-Qaeda, however, was firmly establish that it continued 
to wholeheartedly side with those who opposed dictatorship in the Muslim world 
regardless of whether or not the method chosen by the protestors was different than 
the one the group actually preferred.   
In fact, on a later occasion, Zawahiri, in an apparent attempt to identify with 
Egypt’s political activists, even went out of his way to make it known that he himself 
had taken part in similar protests.  Beginning with the Nasser regime, he would 
basically recount a short history of Egyptian popular dissent:  
And before I migrated from Egypt, I focused on participating in the popular 
uprisings since 1968, and during the popular protests against the regime of 
Gamal Abdulnasser [sic].  And then I participated in many popular protests and 
demonstrations against Sadat and his regime.  And I was in the Tahrir Square in 
1971 with a group of protestors and with me in these demonstrations were kind 
brothers who had honorable stances in the last Egyptian revolution against 
Honsi [sic] Mubarak and his corrupt regime. And if I wasn’t fearful that I would 
cause them embarrassment or harm, I would’ve mentioned them by name and 
spoke about their brave stance.342  
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Despite these efforts, nonetheless, in terms of absolute gains, al-Qaeda’s reputation 
surely achieved very little, if anything at all, by such tactics.  After all, it was quite 
obvious the organization played no significant role in the actual street 
demonstrations that removed Mubarak from office.  Moreover, as Zawahiri himself 
acknowledged, even their words of encouragement tended to suffer great delays in 
reaching the people due to the security concerns the militants had to consider when 
delivering messages.343  Hence, it would have been quite difficult for Zawahiri, or any 
of those associated with him, to make any sort of full-fledged claim on the Egyptian 
people’s victory.  Yet, unlike the United States, al-Qaeda was at least able to avoid 
the accusation that it had acted hypocritically during the upheaval.  And it was from 
this position of comparative integrity that its deputy could feel free to try and add 
even greater fuel to the already blazing flames of anti-American suspicion.   
In one such attempt, Zawahiri, obviously recognizing that many Egyptians 
were likely feeling quite insecure under military rule, saw it fit to remind them just 
how precarious the state of their revolution actually was.  As he cautioned,   
The Egyptian people’s revolution succeeded in removing the tyrant, and then 
what?  And this is the dangerous question and the big challenge.  
Our people and brothers in Egypt: many populaces revolted throughout 
history, but also many of the revolutions ended with undesirable results for these 
populaces, and sometimes opposite of what they want.  Revolutions many times 
get stolen, and they transform into suppressive and abusive regimes.  The French 
Revolution was transformed by Napoleon into an empire, and the Bolsheviks 
stole the Russian Revolution after the German government had prepared Lenin’s 
entrance via a German train in order to steal the country’s governance, in 
exchange for withdrawal from the First World War.  And then, on his hands and 
the hands of his successors, Russian, Central Asia and Eastern Europe submitted 
to one of the worst eras of suppression in human history. 
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 And the revolution of 1952 – Which the Muslim Brothers protected and 
which was supported by the people and looked positively at – the regime 
transformed into an abusive, suppressive and humiliating regime for 60 years.344 
 
Then, after pointing out how the military had in effect assumed lead of the 
revolution, he argued “The tyrant Hosni Mobarak [sic] handed the rule to men in the 
armed forces.  And we have to look at the facts as they are and not to be led after 
emotions; as the ruling military council is not trustworthy, whether through its 
historical record or behavior.”345  Explaining further, he later would go on to add 
“The leadership of the Egyptian armed forces is directly responsible – during the rule 
of Mubarak – for many of the disasters of the political prisoners, whom the military 
courts sentenced to prison and to death row, and now it is responsible for the misery 
of all the political prisoners after Mubarak’s rule.”346  Finally, bringing his argument 
its ultimate aim, he moved on to America. 
According to Zawahiri, the United States was essentially the controlling force 
behind all that had and was to transpire.  As he explained,  
America transferred the rule from an agent to another in order to guarantee a 
calculated change in Egypt away from the goals that threaten the rule, and they 
are: governing with Islam, canceling the peace agreement and relations with 
Israel, and stopping the intelligence, military and economic dependency on 
America. 
 America does not care who rules Egypt after Mubarak; whether a military or 
civil government, or democratic or suppressive, but it cares that the governance 
transfers peacefully, in a calculated way, to a government that walks the same 
footsteps of Mubarak in fighting Islamic forces, protection of Israel’s security, 
sanctions on Gaza and service to the American interests.347 
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Unfortunately for the Obama administration, with its lackluster performance dealing 
with the anti-Mubarak demonstrations, and it relative silence about the behavior of 
Egypt’s new military regime, it would be hard for U.S. officials to dispel such 
allegations amongst an already distrustful Egyptian population, regardless of whether 
the charges were, indeed, accurate or not.  The circumstantial evidence just seemed 
to be rather firmly stacked against them.  And the same would go for America’s 
situation in Tunisia as well.   
As Zawahiri noted, the administration had been doing its best to give the 
impression it was perfectly aligned with the wave of change taking place in the 
Middle East, “But the popular movements in Egypt and Tunisia slapped the U.S. in 
the face when youths protested in Tunisia against the visit of Hilary Clinton, and in 
Egypt they refused to meet her.”348  Clearly, the narrative was not playing out as the 
White House would have hoped.  Of course, for al-Qaeda, on the other hand, these 
incidents were absolutely marvelous news.  In fact, Zawahiri, plainly reveling in such 
developments, paused in the middle of an address to the Egyptian people to state 
“And here I would like to send greetings to the youths of the revolution who refused 
to meet Hilary Clinton, as this is a stance that signifies the youth’s awareness 
regarding the crimes of America and her political hypocrisy.”349  Al-Qaeda may not 
                                                 
348 Ayman al-Zawahiri, And the Noble Knight Dismounts, Flashpoint Partners, 
http://globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0107/flashpoint_zawahiri0611.pdf (accessed 
June 11, 2011). 
 
349 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Message of Hope and Glad Tidings to Our People in Egypt, Episode 6, Flashpoint 
Partners, http://globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/0110/flashpoint_zawahiriegypt6.pdf 
(accessed October 11, 2011). 
 
  86 
have found a way to win the battle for hearts and minds, but, with the United States 
losing as bad as it was, the organization hardly needed to.   
Obviously, there was much for the United States to reflect upon.  In 2007, 
journalist Thomas Friedman, in a seeming state of utter bewilderment, scornfully 
critiqued the George W. Bush administration’s performance in its media war with 
bin Laden by declaring “Mr. Bush is losing a P.R. war to a mass murder.”350  
Unfortunately for those like Friedman, however, four years on, President Bush’s 
successor was sadly doing only slightly better.  Despite its best efforts, the Obama 
administration’s ambiguity had not been able to conceal its hypocrisy, and, as a 
result, al-Qaeda’s message continued to outcompete that of the United States even 
among those residing in nations pushing for what America supposedly championed.  
Obama’s presidency had begun with much promise, but, as his four year term in 
office neared its end, it was beginning to appear as if that promise would go 
unfulfilled.      
As fate would have it, though, the Obama administration would once more 
be presented with yet another chance to restore its reputation.  The Middle East 
protests were far from over, and the United States would be able to take full 
advantage of these circumstances to demonstrate how firmly it was willing to stand 
up for its values.  Finally, it would take swift action on the side of those tyrannized 
by dictatorship.  Nevertheless, as shall be explained in the following pages, upon 
close inspection it is quickly revealed that America’s actions had more to do with 
issues of prestige than principle.  And with its subsequent behavior so thoroughly 
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exposing its continued hypocrisy, its humanitarian deed may have in fact done its 
image more harm than good. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POWER AND PRESTIGE 
Of course, after its abysmal performance dealing with the revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt, many may have assumed the United States would act identically 
when attempting to manage each and every instance of unrest that arose in the 
region.  This assumption, however, would only be partially correct.  The United 
States would certainly continue to make policy decisions based on its interests.  But 
under special circumstances, those interests would actually call for military force 
rather than political inertia.  This was the case when America decided to respond to 
the crisis that erupted in Libya. 
Qaddafi’s Libya 
 The story of Libya, both in regards to its recent revolt and its longer history, 
is in many ways an extension of that in Egypt.  In fact, the 1969 military coup that 
brought Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi to power was actually inspired by the one 
carried out the previous decade by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser.351  Later, Qaddafi would 
even go so far as to offer his Egyptian hero full control of Libya.352  And when 
President Nasser finally passed away, Qaddafi, ever the devout disciple, would 
attempt to proclaim himself the rightful heir to the Nasserite legacy.353   
Clearly, however, he would not be able to merely pick up from where the 
Egyptian leader left off.  As discussed earlier, at the time of Nasser’s death, 
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Nasserism was facing major setbacks.  Qaddafi, therefore, would have to quickly 
learn to command attention in new and innovative ways Nasser surely would have 
never imagined.  The Muslim world was now heavily influenced by Saudi-driven 
Islamic rhetoric.354  And in that environment, Qaddafi needed to find a radical 
approach in order to compete.355   
In the West, Qaddafi’s new ideological dynamism, with its religious 
overtones, would lead many to label him an Islamic fundamentalist.356  In truth, 
however, he was anything but.357  Though he may have, indeed, been quite adept at 
exploiting Islamic symbolism, his government’s religious philosophy clearly had little 
regard for Islamic tradition.358  Age old pillars of Islam, such as charity (Zakat) and 
pilgrimage (Hajj), were reinterpreted to fit the regimes whims, and many of the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad were simply pushed to the side.359  Thus, not 
only was he not seen in the Islamic world as a fundamentalist, many, in fact, 
considered him a heretic.360       
Obviously, nevertheless, the question of whether or not Qaddafi’s religious 
claims were valid had no bearing on the threat his government’s activities posed to 
America’s global strategy.  After all, regardless of how orthodox its theology may or 
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may not have been, the political orientation of his regime was clearly anti-Western.361  
Moreover, “In order to achieve its objectives, and unlike other Arab countries, Libya 
resorted to international terrorism by supporting organizations opposed to Western 
interests.”362  Thus, even with all other matters aside, the militantly defiant nature of 
the upstart nation alone would have placed it on a direct collision course with 
America’s international agenda.363  
As time went on, however, Qaddafi’s government gradually began to feel the 
pain of its erratic behavior.  Its involvement in acts of terrorism had not only led to 
military counter strikes by the United States, but painful sanctions from the United 
Nations and the European Union as well.364  It was largely alienated from much of 
the Arab world.365  And it increasingly faced an ever growing threat from radical 
Islamists.366   
The New Qaddafi 
 Ironically, though, it would actually be America’s call for assistance in its post 
9/11 offensive against international terrorism that would in many ways make 
Qaddafi’s escape from the verge of disaster possible.  The United States was quite 
obviously in need of a great deal of intelligence information, and Qaddafi, apparently 
recognizing that it would be exceedingly difficult for his government to continue to 
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exist in isolation, let it be known that he would be more than happy to assist.367  Of 
course, “Libyan cooperation in the war on terror was due largely to the fact that 
many of the Islamist organizations now targeting the White House were the same or 
similar to those that had threatened the Qaddafi regime throughout the 1990s.”368  
However, Qaddafi’s collaboration in the effort would also gain his government a 
certain degree of diplomatic praise as well.369  Soon thereafter, Libya added to this 
show of goodwill by formally abandoning its nuclear weapons program.370  And by 
May of 2006, the United States would officially remove its former enemy from its list 
of state sponsors of terrorism.371   
As one would expect, Europe was also quite pleased with the transformation 
its North African neighbor was experiencing.372  Unlike the United States, the 
continent had never been able to entirely wean itself off of Libyan oil, and the threat 
of having a hostile regime just off of its shores naturally served as a constant cause 
for concern.373  Thus, the complete normalization of relations with such a strategic 
state could, therefore, be viewed as a victory on multiple levels.  Moreover, with 
Qaddafi now an ally, European nations were also able to negotiate a deal with Libya 
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that would have the latter serve as a sort of coastal security force preventing illegal 
African immigrants from traveling northward across the Mediterranean.374  Hence, 
not only was the Libyan leader no longer viewed as a threat on Europe’s borders, he 
was, in fact, now helping to guard them.   
Libya’s new status in the West was not without its remaining issues, though.  
Back on January 31, 2001, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a Libyan national, was 
convicted of bombing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December of 
1988.375  Subsequently, in an attempt to settle the affair, the Qaddafi’s regime, still 
hoping to curry favor with the West, would agree to pay family members of those 
slain in the attack millions of dollars in restitution.376  Yet, despite the seeming 
resolution of the incident, the issue continued to be a major matter of contention 
due to Libya’s unyielding insistence that Megrahi was, in reality, innocent.377   
Then, in August of 2009, Mr. Megrahi was suddenly transferred from British 
custody into the hands of Libyan authorities after British Petroleum (BP), hoping to 
secure a gas and oil deal with Qaddafi’s government, helped to convince Scottish 
officials that Megrahi should be released due to his losing bout with cancer, which 
was supposedly to kill him within three months.378  Rather predictably, however, 
mass indignation was stirred when it was learned that not only had Megrahi been 
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released from prison under questionable terms, but that he, in fact, was greeted upon 
his arrival in Libya by what some described as a hero’s welcome.379  Libyan officials 
insisted the situation was being blown out of proportion by Western media 
institutions.380  But some analysts argued an unrepentant and ever defiant Qaddafi 
was now mocking the West over its willingness to make concessions to him.381 
Ready for Revolution 
Thus, when the Middle East protests spread to Libya following the fall of 
Mubarak in Egypt, the relationship between the West and Qaddafi was tenuous to 
say the least.  As a result, once it seemed plausible that his government might soon 
collapse from within, his uneasy allies had little incentive to continue standing by 
him.  In past times, the prohibitive cost of regime change may have made Qaddafi 
the Western world’s best option.  But, if the people of Libya were already themselves 
on the verge of successfully duplicating what had just been accomplished in Tunisia 
and Egypt, the West would hardly have cause for deep felt sympathy.   
The disenfranchised in Libya, on the other hand, would have plenty of 
reasons to feel passionate anger if their longstanding government was to remain.  
According to the United Nations, when being compared to other African states, 
including its North African neighbors Egypt and Tunisia, Libya enjoyed the highest 
                                                 
379 Alan Cowell and A.G. Sulzberger, “Libyan Jailed in Bombing of Jetliner Arrives Home,” The New 
York Times, August 21, 2009. 
 
380 Saif Al-Islam El-Qaddafi, “No ‘Hero’s Welcome’ in Libya,” The New York Times, August 30, 2009. 
 
381 Michael Slackman, “Still Chafing After 40 Years, Qaddafi Baffles the West With His Behavior,” 
New York Times, August 26, 2007. 
 
  94 
Human Development Index of any country.382  Nevertheless, the Libyan regime had 
long been accused of brutally suppressing calls for political reform as well.383  
Likewise, “In the name of his ‘permanent revolution,’ Qaddafi also prohibited 
private ownership and retail trade, banned a free press, and subverted the civil 
service and the military leadership.”384  Thus, aside from those closely allied to the 
regime, few in society had the opportunity to have any sort of serious influence on 
life in Libya at all.385  And if Qaddafi was not removed from power, it was extremely 
doubtful that would ever change.386 
Yet, despite all of these converging factors, if there was ever the belief that 
Qaddafi’s ouster would come easily, those hopes would quickly be dashed.  Unlike 
the situations in Tunisia and Egypt in which their leaders were brought down by 
demonstrations, the protests in Libya rapidly collapsed into all out civil war.387  As a 
result, Qaddafi ordered the launch of a brutal counter insurgency campaign against 
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his opponents.388  And, soon, the Libyan opposition would be asking the outside 
world to establish a no fly zone over their nation.389   
 As the calls for outside aerial support increased, however, Defense Secretary 
Gates warned American lawmakers, some of whom were suggesting the United 
States should take part in such an operation, that an action of that magnitude would 
actually be quite a substantial undertaking.390  As he explained, “A no-fly zone begins 
with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses.  That’s the way you do a no-fly 
zone.  And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys 
being shot down.  But that’s the way it starts.”391  In other words, taking the steps 
requested of it would in effect mean the United States was initiating an act of war.  
Still, despite Mr. Gates’ strong cautioning, a number of America’s political leaders 
remained undeterred.392   
Ironically, though, perhaps the greatest boost in morale for those pushing for 
a strong U.S. reaction in Libya may have come days earlier from the very 
administration Secretary Gates worked for.  On February 25th, just 10 days after the 
initial protests in Libya first began, the White House would close the U.S. embassy in 
Libya’s capital, Tripoli, and level harsh unilateral sanctions against Qaddafi’s regime, 
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instantly freezing billions of dollars worth of its assets.393  Then, the following day, an 
official press release noted “The President stated that when a leader’s only means of 
staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the 
legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.”394  
Thus, it was clearly quite obvious to onlookers that the administration was becoming 
more aggressive.  Vague appeals to simply begin an undefined transition period had 
suddenly transformed into talk of immediate exit, and idle threats to merely review 
future funding had given way to swift and severe strikes against vast existing financial 
resources.  Hence, with the level of political ambiguity exhibited during the days of 
the anti-Mubarak protests plainly beginning to recede, it might have appeared to 
some that the United States was shifting toward an offensive.  
Of course, it was naturally much easier for President Obama to take a 
stronger stance with Libya than he would with a regional linchpin such as Egypt.  
But still, it would be hard to deny, regardless of what the cause may have been, that 
his administration had indeed become a great deal bolder in its approach.  In fact, 
even after Gates’ testimony, the president, obviously conscious of the criticism 
previously laid against him, attempted to reaffirm this new assertiveness, which he 
seemed to want to imply he had maintained all along, by stating 
My approach throughout the convulsions that have swept through the Middle 
East is: number one, no violence against citizens; number two, that we stand for 
freedom and democracy.  And in the situation in Libya, what you’ve seen is: 
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number one, violence against citizens and the active urging of violence against 
unarmed citizens by Qadhafi; and number two, you have seen with great clarity 
that he has lost legitimacy with his people. 
 And so let me just be very unambiguous about this.  Colonel Qadhafi needs 
to step down from power and leave.  That is good for his country.  That is good 
for his people.  It’s the right thing to do.395 
 
Nonetheless, regardless of the president’s decision to make a decisive break with 
Qaddafi, the act of openly severing ties with Libya’s autocracy was still a far cry from 
going the added step of supplying the rebels with military support, as many were 
hoping he would do.  And he would quickly find that in some quarters of the world 
his limited efforts were simply not enough.   
In France, for instance, there was open criticism of the United States for its 
reluctance to take military action.396  French President Nicolas Sarkozy had already 
been ahead of Obama in calling on Qaddafi to step down.397  Now, the White House 
seemed to be lagging behind once again.  It was beginning to look as though the 
prestige of the nation lauded as “the leader of the free world” might soon be 
tarnished by the charge that it was afraid to lead.   
According to some policy analysts in America, however, there was clearly 
good reason for the United States to view the events in Libya differently than they 
were in France.  As Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
and former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department under George W. 
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Bush, candidly explained at the time, in terms of direct U.S. interests, “Libya is by 
[sic] far from the most important country in the Middle East.”398  Haas, therefore, 
argued that “To have a tremendous mismatch, to invest far more than our interests 
warrant, makes no sense.”399  He, furthermore, noted, in regards to the rebels 
themselves,  
We know we hate Gadhafi, or people do.  But are we so sure that those we 
would be helping are good guys?  Do we really think, if we went in, they’d all be 
reading the Federalist Papers in Arabic translation a couple of days later?  We 
simply don’t know enough about Libya.  One of the lessons of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, I would suggest, only intervene militarily if you really know the 
country well enough to know what you’re getting into.  We clearly do not on 
Libya.400   
 
Nevertheless, regardless of whatever truth there may have actually been to Haas’ 
rather frank comments, there was still a certain important factor he was plainly 
neglecting to bring into the conversation.  And that was America’s power driven 
interest in ensuring Europe’s defense in the face of Libya’s domestic chaos. 
The Prison of Preponderant Prestige  
To understand why Libya’s threat to European security was so important to 
the United States, it is first necessary to once again discuss the hegemonic strategy 
that actually underlies America’s rhetorical liberalism.  As Layne explains, 
The strategy of preponderance assumes that the United States has vital interest in 
maintaining “stability” (a broad and nebulous term) in the international system.  
Underlying the strategy is fear of what might happen in a world no longer shaped 
by pre-dominant U.S. power.  Continued American hegemony is important 
because it is seen as the prerequisite for global stability.  Instability is dangerous 
because it threatens the link that connects U.S. security to the strategic interests 
furthered by economic interdependence.  Economic interdependence is an 
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overriding U.S. interest because it is viewed as both a cause and a consequence of 
peace and stability in the international system.  Indeed, the role of 
interdependence in the strategy of preponderance is circular: interdependence is 
a vital interest because it leads to peace and stability (and prosperity); however, 
peace and stability must exist in the international system before interdependence 
can take root. 
 Geographically, the strategy of preponderance indentifies Europe, East Asia, 
and the Persian Gulf as regions where the United States has vital security 
interests.  Europe and East Asia are important because they are the regions from 
which new great power wars could occur; central to the functioning of an 
interdependent international system; and vital to U.S. prosperity.  The Persian 
Gulf is important because of oil.  Geographically, these three regions constitute 
America’s vital interests; however, its security interests are not confined to these 
regions.  The United States must also be concerned with the “peripheries” – 
regions that are geographically removed from the core – because turmoil there 
could affect the core.401 
 
In fact, “The paradox of America’s hegemonic grand strategy is that it compels the 
United States to risk war over strategically unimportant places to prove – to allies 
and adversaries alike – that it will defend stakes that are important.”402  Thus, as 
neoclassical realism would suggest, although Libya itself was relatively insignificant to 
the U.S., the fact that its instability could cause panic among its European neighbors 
made its situation a major concern because it endangered American prestige.   
 Indeed, prestige is so paramount in terms of U.S. protocol that in some cases 
the United States has actually been willing to watch scores of people die right in 
Europe’s backyard simply because there was the impression that America’s 
reputation had not sufficiently suffered yet.   For example, during the early stages of 
the 1990s Bosnian war, in which around 250,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed in 
interethnic strife, the Clinton administration did little more than issue hollow threats 
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to the Serbian forces instigating the violence.403  As the conflict dragged on, however, 
the White House began to fear that its hesitance to enforce the peace might begin to 
ebb away at its credibility as guarantor of European security.404  It was then, and only 
then, that “The president sent Richard Holbrooke, former assistant secretary of state 
for European affairs and former ambassador to Germany, to resolve the Bosnian 
war, backed by the threat of unilateral military action.405  Soon, thereafter, NATO, 
now spurred on by America’s resolve, began its bombing campaign of Serb forces, 
which ultimately led the leaders of those forces to sit down at the negation table.406   
 Similarly, later that same decade, the Clinton administration would waste well 
over a year idly warning Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic that if he did not put 
an end to the program of graduated ethnic cleansing he was carrying out in Kosovo 
he would be faced with military reprisal.407  Eventually, though, the administration 
realized “A failure to act upon those threats would undermine US prestige within 
NATO, lead the allies to question the future of Washington’s security commitment, 
and possibly set in motion an erosion of the hegemonic position of the United States 
in Europe.”408  America, therefore, finally moved forward with the initiation of an 
aerial offensive to strike against Milosevic’s forces.409  When that appeared not to be 
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enough, the administration, realizing it could not afford to lose, indicated it was 
prepared to escalate its direct involvement even further.410  It was at that point that 
Milosevic at last agreed to capitulate.411    
 Unsurprisingly, one of the most significant aspects that both of these 
instances of U.S. intervention had in common was the use of normative rhetoric 
about humanitarianism and the protection of values.412  U.S. hegemony demanded 
that Europe understood that NATO, with America at its lead, of course, was the 
only viable option for European defense.413  But an argument based on such a reality 
would hardly fit in with America’s liberal narrative.  Thus, though the primary 
concern of the United States was letting it be known it would not allow a regional 
conflict to destabilize its allies, it was compelled to cite ethical concerns in order to 
justify the actions necessary to do so.      
 In much the same way, the greatest concern the Obama administration had 
in Libya was the fact that Qaddafi had committed the unforgivable crime of allowing 
instability, thereby, leaving his nation in danger of becoming a potentially 
destabilizing failed state.414  In both Tunisia and Egypt, there were national 
institutions that could be relied upon to help maintain a degree of order after the 
removal of their heads of state.415  But in Libya, this was not the case at all.416  There, 
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the whole of the nation was structured around the regime, and if that foundation was 
abruptly destroyed there would be very little else to replace it.417   Furthermore, 
according to testimony given by Hilary Clinton before Congress, many of the al-
Qaeda activists the United States faced in combat over the years had come from the 
very region of Libya that was now leading the break from Qaddafi’s rule.418  There 
were, therefore, worries that if things were left to simply fall apart without guidance, 
and such extremist elements ultimately gained the upper hand, Libya could eventually 
turn into another Afghanistan.419  Only this time, it would be located right on the 
doorstep of Europe.   
Despite the evident danger, though, what was certainly clear was that there 
was very little chance the West would be able to simply build up the Qaddafi regime 
in order to return to the previous status quo.  After all, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy had already placed himself much too far out on a limb to allow that to 
happen.  Indeed, not only had President Sarkozy given his support to the anti-
Qaddafi rebel forces, but by March 10th he had, in fact, recognized them as Libya’s 
legitimate government.420  Thus, by the time James Clapper, America’s director of 
national intelligence, reported later that same day in the United States that it looked 
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as though Qaddafi would in the long run prevail, France was all but locked into its 
position.421   
Of course, some in Europe voiced the suspicion that in reality Sarkozy had 
only rushed to pledge his assistance to the anti-Qaddafi rebels because he was still 
embarrassed by his offer to help quell the pro-democracy revolution in Tunisia.422  
But regardless of how true that might be, once he had so publically made such a 
commitment, he was surely not in a position to just act as if he had never done so.  If 
he had, the prestige of his own nation may have suffered.  Thus, the only way things 
could end favorably for Sarkozy was if Qaddafi either acquiesced on his own or was 
forced to do so.  Any resentful European nations would, unfortunately, just have to 
endure being dragged along for the ride.423   
Ironically, not long before, the French were actually selling a good deal of 
military weaponry to the Qaddafi regime.424  But now, as fate would have it, they 
would be worrying about the safety of those targeted by the very arms they 
themselves had made available.  Fortunately for France, however, these concerns 
would not be theirs alone, for the British had already agreed to side with Sarkozy on 
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his ill planned venture.425  And the United States, trapped by its strategic obligations, 
would quickly be sucked into the conflict as well. 
For the Sake of Civilians         
On March 17, 2011, a vote from the United Nations Security Council 
authorized foreign military intervention into Libya.426  The primary goal of the 
mission was said to be to protect Libyan civilians from harm.427  France and Britain 
had worked together to map out the resolution, while the Arab League, long at odds 
with its unpopular North African member state, agreed to give the measure its full 
support.428  For its part, America generally went along with the plan, but insisted the 
intervention force be given a robust range of options to fulfill its objectives.429  All 
that was left was for the President to explain his decision to the American people.     
Thus, the day after the Security Council’s declaration, President Obama set 
out to make his case both against Qaddafi and for the intervention.  As he explained, 
Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qadhafi would commit 
atrocities against his people.  Many thousands could die.  A humanitarian crisis 
would ensue.  The entire region could be destabilized, endangering many of our 
allies and partners.  The calls of the Libyan people for help would go 
unanswered.  The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun.  
Moreover, the words of the international community would be rendered hollow. 
 And that’s why the United States has worked with our allies and partners to 
shape a strong international response at the United Nations.  Our focus has been 
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clear: protecting innocent civilians within Libya and holding the Qadhafi regime 
accountable.430 
 
Notably, though, perhaps Obama’s greatest ally in his indictment of Qaddafi was 
Qaddafi himself, for the vitriol exhibited in the Libyan leader’s speeches made him at 
certain points seem poised for wholesale massacre.  For instance, after weeks of 
fighting, Libya’s woefully outgunned rebel forces had largely been beaten back to 
their stronghold in the eastern city of Benghazi.431  Nevertheless, as the president 
pointed out during his speech, once in position to take the city, Qaddafi wrathfully 
insisted he would have no mercy upon those held up there.432   
Seizing upon such belligerence, the president presented the situation as if all 
700,000 of Benghazi’s residents had been in danger of being indiscriminately 
slaughtered, and that thus, given the circumstance, he and his allies had no choice 
but to intercede.433  Of course, what Mr. Obama failed to mention was that at the 
same time Qaddafi had also offered amnesty to those who laid down their 
weapons.434  Surely, many would have still been killed in the assault.  But, it is hardly 
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clear that any sort of mass genocide on the scale the president seemed to want to 
imply was about to occur.435       
Besides, it is difficult to see how the White House could try to use concern 
for Libyan civilians as a defense for its actions anyway.  After all, according President 
Obama himself, Qaddafi had been know for savagely terrorizing his citizens for 
decades.436  Yet, after he no longer appeared to pose a major threat to the West, the 
United States, which itself was not even bound by a dependency on Libyan oil, 
seemed perfectly content to overlook such human rights issues for the sake of 
furthering its own interest.437  No threats of attack were made, nor were there any 
sanctions.   
Naturally, these inconsistencies once again left the administration open to 
charges of hypocrisy.  As Zawahiri would later argue,  
Why didn’t America mobilize against al-Qadhafi before the uprising of the 
Libyans [sic] people?  Wasn’t America handing the prisoners to al-Qadhafi in its 
war on Islam under the name of ‘terrorism,’ in order to be tortured, beaten and 
killed?  And from them – as we consider him – the martyr Sheikh Ibn al-Sheikh 
al-Liby, and from them leaders of Islamic fighting groups. 
 And why did America and the West go silent over the massacre of Abu 
Sleem prison, where more than 1,200 martyrs were killed?  And why didn’t it 
freeze the accounts and investments of al-Qadhafi and his family before?438 
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Sadly, the answer to these questions was obviously quite clear.  America had not 
acted before because America had not been concerned about Qaddafi’s abuse of his 
people until it was perceived as a danger to the West.  Apparently, the United States 
believed the democratic values Obama spoke of defending during his speech were 
only threatened when America’s interests were as well.  And all the liberal rhetoric in 
the world could not hide that fact.   
Thus, it should really be no surprise that the polling data evaluating Obama’s 
performance during the Arab uprisings was still woefully negative in spite of his 
decision to intervene in Libya’s unfolding crisis.  Indeed, for one to think it would be 
otherwise they would have to, as Scheuer expressed earlier, think Muslims were 
stupid people.  America was doing what was in America’s interest, plain and simple.  
The Libyan opposition was merely in position to benefit from that. 
The War Plan 
 At times, though, it was not exactly clear to onlookers what kind of help the 
rebels’ benefactors would actually be.  As the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington 
D.C. based research institute, reported several weeks after the conflict first began,  
NATO’s campaign might easily be called “The War of Contradictions,” since it 
has said one thing and done another from the beginning.  Its entire framework 
for intervention is based on a no-fly zone to protect civilians that was exposed as 
a cover for battlefield air support for the Libyan rebels almost immediately.  
While some NATO nations see the campaign as one intended to protect 
civilians, France, Britain and the United States are clearly set on regime change, a 
course that cannot be reversed at this point.439 
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Unfortunately for America, however, the war would not work out as planned.  The 
problem was, just “As in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Western coalition intervened in 
Libya with only a weak grasp of the local society.”440  It grossly underestimated 
Qaddafi’s support in the Western part of his country.441  And, therefore, falsely 
assumed the war would take only a matter of weeks.442    
 Only adding to the disorder was America’s rather odd role in the conflict.  
Initially, it was suggested that perhaps the French and British might be capable of 
executing the campaign against Qaddafi’s forces themselves.443  However, unlike 
America, neither nation enjoyed the stockpiles of cruise missiles necessary to knock 
out Libya’s air defenses with efficiency.444  Nor did they possess aircraft equivalent to 
America’s A-10 or AC-130.445  Hence, there was simply no way they would be able to 
carry out the needed strikes with the same level of proficiency as the United States.   
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Furthermore, “The US objected to a Franco-British operation in Libya” because “It 
would bypass NATO and, thus, the US-headed chain of command.”446  As already 
explained, American hegemony depended on its leadership role in Europe, and it 
could not allow that to be challenged even by its friends.  Still, a battle fatigued 
United States could not help but be painfully aware of the fact that it already had 
major commitments in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.447  And as a result, it was 
ultimately concluded that America would merely head the critical opening stages of 
the war and then humbly pass the lead off to rest of its NATO allies.448     
Nevertheless, even in this reduced capacity, the first two months of the war 
alone cost the United States $716 million, and later estimates predicted that at its 
existing rate America’s back-up role would bring that figure to around $1.1 billion by 
September.449  Of course, the White House obviously understood how disastrous it 
would be for U.S. prestige if it were to completely withdraw from the conflict.  But, 
not only was the administration facing an ever increasing price tag, some, noting the 
operation in Libya was not an officially declared war, had, in fact, begun to debate 
the very constitutional legality of the military’s continued involvement.450  It appeared 
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that America’s opportunity to play itself up as an active defender of political change 
might be slowly slipping away. 
The Struggle for Bahrain 
Meanwhile, in another part of the Muslim world, the Obama administration 
would at the same time find itself facing a perhaps even greater threat to its chance 
to remake its image.  On February 14, 2011, anti-government demonstrations were 
launched on the island nation of Bahrain to protest against the ruling monarchy’s 
unwillingness to enact long sought after democratic reforms.451  When a brutal 
crackdown followed, the White House, as usual, expressed its concern over the 
violence, but in general the United States, which happened to have its fifth naval 
fleet permanently hosted in Bahrain, did little more.452  Unsurprisingly, with America 
willing to go so far as to take military action when it suited its purposes in Libya, its 
reluctance to make a stronger stance against the Bahraini royal family brought some 
to once more accuse it of acting hypocritically.453  
This was certainly not the first time the White House responded in such a 
way when it came to Bahrain, however.  In fact, just two months before the pro-
democracy protests broke out, Secretary Clinton was actually in Bahrain defending 
the gulf nation’s record on making steps toward a more democratic system.454  
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Similarly, the American Embassy in Bahrain had in the past both criticized the 
human rights group Freedom House for downgrading Bahrain’s status from “partly 
free” to “not free” and cast doubt on a report from Human Rights Watch when it 
asserted Bahraini police at times used torture during interrogations.455  Apparently, 
the United States was simply not prepared to truly recognize what political direction 
its close ally was headed in.456    
The protesters in Bahrain, on the other hand, were clearly not in the mood to 
go along with such delusions.  The small island nation of around one million 
residents was long known for the simmering tensions that existed between its Sunni 
ruling class and its disenfranchised majority Shi’i population.457  Matters only became 
worse in the early 1990s when government programs designed to expand the state’s 
economy marginalized working class Shi’i citizens to an even greater degree.458  The 
al Khalifa family promised its subjects greater political inclusion to help rectify the 
nation’s disparities.459  But, in the years just prior to the February 2011 uprising, King 
Hamad, often cited by America as a reformer, abruptly began to allow the small 
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progress his country made reverse itself.460  Now he would be asked to answer for his 
behavior. 
Unfortunately for the demonstrators, however, this domestic civil rights 
struggle would soon be turned into a regional campaign of political suppression.  
Saudi Arabia, which built a 15 mile causeway between itself and its much smaller 
neighbor for just such an occasion, was quite concerned about Bahrain’s sectarian-
laced crisis due to the possible implications it had for its own stability.461  The Saudi 
Shi’i community represented only a minority of the kingdom’s overall citizenry.462  
Yet, they simultaneously constituted the majority of those residing in the nation’s 
eastern provinces where the states’ vast oil fields are found.463  Recognizing the 
affinity this restive population felt with their adjacently located co-religionists in 
Bahrain, the royal family feared a Shi’i victory in such a closely neighboring country 
might easily inspire a similar mass uprising among its own Shi’i.  Its Sunni led 
government, therefore, decided to offer authorities in Bahrain whatever assistance 
needed.464  As far as it was concerned, defending the al Khalifas was essentially the 
same as defending itself.465  And there apparently seemed to be no limits to what it 
would do for that sake.        
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Indeed, when rumors of an impending day of protest within Saudi Arabia’s 
own borders began to swirl, its foreign minister issued a stern warning in which “He 
said the regime will cut off any finger raised against it.”466  Clearly, the Saudi 
government had no intentions of going anywhere.  Its message was straightforward.  
Acts of dissent would not be tolerated.  And those who dared to attempt them 
would face severe consequences for doing so.   
Thus, when Saudi Arabia volunteered to send its security forces into Bahrain, 
Bahraini Shi’i were quite understandably apprehensive about what would be headed 
over the causeway.467  Saudi officials insisted their troops were entering the country 
only to help maintain order. 468  But, opposition groups did not see it that way at all.  
To them, the operation launched on March 14th was no more and no less than a 
foreign occupation.469   
Also condemning the insertion of outside forces, which it referred to as an 
“invasion,” was the Islamic Republic of Iran.470  According to it, the move 
represented both a violation of international law and a threat to the safety of 
defenseless Bahraini men and women.471  In return, however, Saudi and Bahraini 
officials accused the Shi’i dominated Iranian government of trying to spread its 
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influence by interfering in Bahrain’s internal affairs.472  In fact, though evidence was 
never provided to back up the claim, the Bahraini government would at one point 
accuse Iran of actually providing opposition groups with aid.473  The demonstrators 
denied this claim, though, and insisted their struggle was about democratic rights, not 
sectarian politics.474 
Of course, American officials in the meantime remained almost completely 
silent about the deployment because their interests lay with those of their Saudis 
allies.475  Not only was Saudi Arabia a major supplier of petroleum to the United 
States itself, with the largest oil reserves in the world, it was essentially the anchor of 
the global market America had taken responsibility for.476  Thus, in terms of U.S. 
interests, it was almost as if the circumstances in this situation were the complete 
opposite of those in Libya.  As a result, in this case, not only would America not use 
military force to intercede on the side of its supposed values, even its rhetorical 
support of such ideals would be largely pushed to the side.  Customary statements 
about the need for greater reform, such as the one made by Defense Secretary Gates 
just days before the entrance of the Saudis, would, no doubt, continue.477  But, for 
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the most part, Bahrain’s pro-democracy activists would essentially be left to fend for 
themselves.     
Unsurprisingly, Bahrain’s government took full advantage of the blind eye 
that had been turned to it.  Indeed, in their efforts to discourage the progress of the 
opposition’s fledgling campaign, Bahraini authorities would do everything from 
destroying Shi’i mosques to beating and detaining young school girls who took part 
in demonstrations.478  Even some doctors and nurses, who did no more than care for 
those injured during the protests, would be targeted for arrest and retaliation.479  
Perhaps most dramatic, though, was the razing to the ground of Bahrain’s 300 foot 
Pearl roundabout sculpture on March 18th. 480  To the protesters, the structure had 
come to represent the focal point of the nation’s activism just as Tahrir Square had 
been in Egypt.481  To those in government, though, it was center of “terrorist 
activity.”482   
The End Game 
America, however, would not be able to merely dance around the Bahraini 
issue forever.  On May 19, 2011, President Obama would be making a major speech 
addressing his administration’s policy regarding the Arab uprisings.483  He would, 
                                                 
478 Liz Sly, “Blooms of Arab Spring Fading,” The Washington Post, May 13, 2011. 
 
479 Clifford Krauss, “Strife in Bahrain Sweeps Past Front Door of a Central Hospital,” The New York 
Times, April 13, 2011.   
 
480 Ethan Bronner, “A monument Leveled, Solidarity for Shiites and Large-Scale Demonstrations: 
Bahrain Tears Down Pearl Sculpture,” The New York Times, March 19, 2011.  
 
481 Ibid. 
 
482 Ibid. 
 
483 Rami Khouri, Issam Fares, and Mona Eltahawy, interview by Jeffrey Brown, PBS Newshour, PBS, 
May 19, 2011. 
  116 
therefore, have to find a skillful means of explaining away not only the contradictory 
stance the White House had taken on Bahrain’s situation, but the many examples of 
double standards exhibited during its dealings with other nations as well.  
Unfortunately for Mr. Obama, though, such a task would ultimately prove quite 
beyond his ability.   
Two days before the president’s speech, the Pew Research Center released its 
report highlighting the Muslim world’s low opinion of his performance up to that 
point.484  Hence, the White House was surely aware that its Muslim audience would 
be skeptical of what was to be said from the very outstart.  Yet, despite having this 
prior knowledge, President Obama still seemed extremely ill prepared to even make a 
serious attempt to win them over.  As Egyptian-American journalist Mona Eltahawy 
argued, 
I think that President Obama was trying to catch up.  And remember that 
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire Dec. 17.  So, it has taken several weeks of 
trying to catch up.  But I don’t think that the president really got there, because 
what I heard was a speech that perhaps was educational and was trying to realign 
U.S. foreign policy for a domestic audience. 
 But for an audience in the Middle East and North Africa, that is very fed up 
and has long been very fed up of a clear double standard in U.S. foreign policy, 
and a policy that would take the side of dictators, at the expense of the people, I 
don’t think that the speech finally caught up, because, I mean, I heard many 
positive things, but there were many things that were glaringly missing. 
 For example, the United States gives the Egyptian armed forces $1.3 billion 
in aid every year.  The Supreme Military Council, which runs Egypt now, is 
endangering the very values and the revolution that President Obama praised 
today, because the Supreme Military Council in Egypt detains people, detains 
revolutionaries, tortures them, and puts them on military trial. 
 And then when it come to the most glaring omission of all, and the country 
that is the worst offender and strongest counter-revolutionary force, Saudi 
Arabia, the president didn’t mention it at all.  President Obama mentioned Iran 
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as a potential threat in Bahrain.  But remember, Saudi Arabia has actual troops 
on the ground in Bahrain. 
 And when it comes to religious freedom and women’s rights, which the 
president mentioned -- and I praise him for that -- Saudi Arabia again is the 
worst offender, especially when it comes to its Shia minority and women’s rights. 
 So, I heard -- for a domestic American audience, those missing sentences 
might not be important, but for the people on the ground, who have far 
outpaced the U.S., I think they will be disappointed that President Obama didn’t 
mention that.485     
 
Thus, whatever it was the president hoped to accomplish with his speech, he 
obviously was unable to hit his mark.  Indeed, as Ms. Eltahawy noted, his address, 
though perhaps effective for a domestic audience, left many in the Muslim world 
only feeling more disillusioned.  For example, when Egyptian student activist Noor 
Nour was asked by CNN host Fareed Zakaria what he thought of the president’s 
speech he replied “I just -- all I could see was hypocrisy and the continuation of 
hypocrisy.”486  Once again, it appeared that America’s words were doing it more 
harm than good.   
 There were, nonetheless, some fairly positive comments regarding Obama’s 
address as well.  Many Bahrainis, for instance, were rather pleasantly surprised that 
the president had actually mentioned their struggle at all.487  They were particularly 
pleased that he had been willing to denounce the destruction of Shia mosques, call 
for dialogue between the two opposing sides, and candidly point out that it would be 
difficult to hold such a dialogue while opposition leaders were being held in jail 
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cells.488  Still, even among Bahrainis who were to some degree happy with the 
president’s speech, there remained the charge that the United States was plainly 
continuing to operate under a system of double standards.489  Clearly, the president 
had been willing to go farther than anyone else in his administration.490  But, not only 
had Saudi Arabia not been mentioned in his speech, Bahrain’s own leaders had, in 
fact, been largely let of the hook as well.491  Yes, a few of their transgressions were 
briefly mentioned, but there was essentially nothing said about the subject beyond 
that. 
Predictably, with this sort of political climate to contend with, Bahraini 
opposition groups would ultimately be unable to bring about the peaceful democratic 
transition they had hoped for even months after their protests first began.492  
Government intransigence had proven far too unyielding, while American silence 
remained all too constant.493  A low-level effort to maintain the struggle would, of 
course, carry on.494  But the prospects for any significant change looked increasingly 
unlikely.495   
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In Libya, on the other hand, where American interests led the situation in the 
opposite direction, the story would be quite different.  By August, its capital city 
Tripoli would be in the hands of NATO backed rebels, while both Qaddafi and his 
family members would find themselves abruptly forced into hiding.496  Soon 
thereafter, Western countries would begin to press for the release of frozen Libyan 
assets, and preliminary discussions regarding lucrative oil contracts with allied 
nations like France, Britain and the United States would start.497   Naturally, there 
would still be some problems, such as the tensions that arose between the rebels and 
their patrons when the former refused to extradite convicted Pan Am bomber al 
Megrahi, who obviously had not passed away as expected.498  But, all in all, things 
seemed to be concluding relatively well.499   
Unfortunately for the Obama administration, however, there would be very 
little chance that the accomplishments of the Libyan rebellion would in the end do 
much to improve the Muslim world’s perception of the United States.  After all, its 
handling of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt had already cast serious doubts on 
its commitment to opposing authoritarianism, and its silence on the Bahrain issue 
surely only gave its critics more reason to be skeptical.  Thus, though there would 
certainly be many who would be pleased to see Qaddafi go, his departure would in 
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no way leave America looking like a paragon of international political justice.  
Indeed, it would likely only highlight the fact that the United States had been willing 
to work so long with a man it clearly knew to have tyrannical tendencies.  
America’s trouble with its reputation in the Muslim world was clearly not its 
only problem, though.  In fact, as shall be explained in the remaining pages, it was, in 
reality, only a very small aspect of a much greater crisis.  Over the decades, U.S. 
policy makers had slowly allowed their hegemonic practices to work their nation into 
a position of grave danger.  And now, trapped in a costly, and essentially futile, battle 
for hearts and minds, it seemed as though they might not ever quite get around to 
even acknowledging they needed to save it. 
  121 
CHAPTER 5 
FOR THE FUTURE 
As explained earlier, the Muslim world, or more specifically the Persian Gulf 
and its expansive periphery, is important to the United States because the vast 
natural resources found there help to power the world system America strives to 
command.  With the ongoing passage of time, however, the United States has found 
it ever more difficult to maintain its control over not only this particular region, but, 
more importantly, the broader global structure it is vital to.  As Layne explains,  
The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global 
dominance.  From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax 
Americana that has endured for more than six decades.  It seemed the sun would 
never set on the U.S. empire.   
But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon’s assigned role.  
Militarily, a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the 
global commons.  Economically, it offers public goods by opening its domestic 
market to other states, supplying liquidity for the world economy, and providing 
the reserve currency.  A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises, not 
cause them.  It is supposed to be the lender of last resort, not the biggest 
borrower.  Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging 
rescue, the United States no longer fits the part.500 
  
Unfortunately, though, many in the United States refuse to acknowledge America’s 
new circumstances.501  Instead, rather than accept the obvious, they stubbornly 
maintain that the nation has merely hit a temporary downturn that it will soon likely 
recover from.502   
What such people sadly fail to recognize, however, is that America’s current 
difficulty with maintaining its hegemony is not simply the result of a bout of bad luck 
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that will eventually pass with time.  Indeed, “One of history’s few incontestable 
lessons is that the pursuit of hegemony invariably is self-defeating, because it 
provokes counter-balancing efforts by other states and leads to what Paul Kennedy 
famously called “imperial overstretch.”503  Political economist Robert  
Gilpin has outlined succinctly the causal logic supporting this conclusion.  As he 
points out, the overhead costs of empire are high: “In order to maintain its 
dominant position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the 
financing of allies, foreign aid, and costs associated with maintaining the 
international economy.  These protection and related costs are not productive 
investments; they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominate 
state.”  Ultimately, the decline in its relative power leaves a waning hegemon less 
well placed to fend of challenges to its system-wide strategic interests.504 
 
Hence, with this being the case, to promote the idea that the United States need only 
wait patiently while maintaining its current course is not only naive, it is, in fact, 
dangerous to America’s future. 
 Still, some optimists may attempt to find hope in the fact that “Much of 
America’s decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies, but as the U.S. 
stumbles, others – notably China, India, and Russia – are rising.”505  Consequently, 
even if the United States were to try and quickly formulate some radical new strategy 
to perpetuate its supremacy, it would almost certainly be too late because challenger 
states, which Gilpin warns of, would clearly have no rational incentive to give up 
strategic ground they have painstakingly fought to gain.  Thus, as heartbreaking as it 
may be for U.S. policymakers bent on global hegemony, the harsh cold reality is that 
                                                 
503 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 6. 
 
504 Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the 
Twenty-First Century?,” World Policy Journal 15, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 23. 
 
505 Christopher Layne, “Graceful Decline: The End of Pax Americana,” Amconmag.com, May 1, 2010, 
http://amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/ (accessed December 10, 2011). 
 
  123 
inevitably “The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close, and 
international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet 
fully multipolar.”506  What this means is that America will either take advantage of 
this brief period of transformation to prepare for a more modest future or it will 
soon be doomed to become a thing of the past.      
 Of course, the choice would appear to be quite clear.  Obviously, “Global 
dominance is a prescription for endless trouble – especially in its neoconservative 
variant.”507  So one would think, then, that there would really only be one option.  
But, “Unfortunately, the Obama administration is populated from top to bottom 
with liberal imperialists who remain committed to trying to govern the world, albeit 
with less emphasis on big-stick diplomacy and more emphasis on working with allies 
and international institutions.”508  And, regrettably, since it actually does make an 
effort to place a more multilateral face on its imperialistic policies, many may have 
come to believe the Obama White House, in fact, is trying to bring about a change.     
Nothing, however, could be a greater misunderstanding of what modern 
internationalism actually represents in practice.  As Samuel P. Huntington, creator of 
the famous “clash of civilizations” theory, explains, “Most of the principal 
international institutions date from shortly after World War II and are shaped 
according to Western interests, values, and practices.”509  Yet, “Decisions made at the 
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U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests 
of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world 
community.”510  Indeed, “The very phrase ‘the world community’ has become the 
euphemistic collective noun (replacing “the Free World”) to give global legitimacy to 
actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.”511  
Thus, despite its use of crafty rhetorical rationalizations, the global imperialist system 
essentially remains the same as it always has been.  While normative international 
organizations may constrain the weak, America, as the world’s greatest power, 
normally gets whatever it wants, and “If it does not, it ignores the institution and 
does what it deems to be in its own interest.”512  Therefore, though ostensibly 
universalistic, the Obama administration’s decision to make greater utilization of this 
useful cover reflects nothing other than its shrewd appreciation of the advantages 
associated with imperialism’s more diplomatic forms. 
The problem, though, as demonstrated by the administration’s Libya 
campaign, is that, even in America’s seemingly humbler role in ensuring geostrategic 
stability, it is still in danger of incurring highly significant hegemony costs by being 
dragged by self imposed obligation into situations that could, in reality, be handled 
by others, though perhaps not with the same level of proficiency.  What is more, 
things are only guaranteed to get worse.  This is due to the fact that 
The United States continually is forced to expand the geographical scope of its 
strategic commitments.  Core and periphery are – or, more correctly, are 
perceived to be – interdependent strategically.  However, while the core is 
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constant, the “turbulent frontier” in the periphery is always expanding.  U.S. 
policymakers fear what might happen – falling dominoes and closure – if the 
United States does not intervene and broaden its defensive perimeters.  Thus, the 
United States finds itself extending its security frontier ever farther into the 
periphery.  There is, however, no obvious stopping point to this process, which 
tends to become self-perpetuating, because “expansion tends to feed on itself in 
order to protect what is acquired.” Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by 
turmoil on the other side of the line which requires yet another outward push of 
the security frontier.513 
 
Unfortunately, with every new challenge being perceived as a crucial test of 
America’s credibility, its hegemony obsessed leaders will have no choice but to 
continue along with this process because “The entire fabric of American grand 
strategy would unravel if U.S. allies no longer felt reassured by Washington’s security 
umbrella.”514  Thus, trapped by the fear of losing its international standing, the 
United States will be forced to march off to battle time and time again with an ever 
decreasing return on its investment until eventually this suicidal way of life results in 
America’s downfall.  
 Ironically, there was perhaps no one who understood the dynamics of this 
convoluted quandary better than al-Qaeda’s late leader Osama bin Laden.  In fact, 
being so keenly aware of it, he would consciously do all he could to spread American 
forces as thin as possible.  As he once bragged following an operation in Asia, 
All we had to do was send two mujahidin to the Far East to raise up a rag on 
which “al-Qaeda” was written, and the generals came running.  This inflicted 
human, financial, and political losses on America without them even achieving 
anything worth mentioning, apart from providing business for their private 
corporations.  In addition, we gained expertise in guerilla and attritional warfare 
in our struggle against the great oppressive superpower, Russia, in which we and 
the mujahidin ground it down for ten years until it went bankrupt, and decided 
to withdraw in defeat, praise and thanks be to God.  We are continuing to make 
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America bleed to the point of bankruptcy, by God’s will.  For God is able to do 
that.515 
 
Similarly, in October of 2008, the Washington Post reported “Al-Qaeda is watching the 
U.S. stock market’s downward slide with something akin to jubilation, with its 
leaders hailing the financial crisis as a vindication of its strategy of crippling 
America’s economy through endless, costly foreign wars against Islamist 
insurgents.”516  Of course, for the organization to have actually believed the entirety 
of such a claim it would have had to of overlooked quite a few of the other factors 
that contributed to America’s financial woes.  But it was, nevertheless, at any rate 
correct in thinking that its strategy had at least found some degree of success in 
bringing harm to the U.S. economy.   
As the New York Times noted in 2010, “The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have cost Americans a staggering $1 trillion to date, second only in inflation-adjusted 
dollars to the $4 trillion price tag for World War II, when the United States put 16 
million men and women into uniform and fought on three continents.”517  Granted, 
with the vastness of the U.S. economy, that figure only comes to around 1.2 percent 
of America’s gross domestic product.518  But, with the country struggling through 
financially difficult times, it can hardly afford to simply dismiss this sort of significant 
dollar amount.  In fact, the crippled U.S. economy has become such an important 
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strategic concern that in 2010 military planners for the first time in American history 
mentioned the nation’s debt and deficit in the U.S. National Security Strategy 
report.519  Hence, though in another era al-Qaeda’s financial threat may have been 
somewhat easily rationalized away, today it could very well end up being the 
relatively large straw that breaks the weak camel’s back.    
Nonetheless, even with this being the case, it must not be forgotten that 
“Terrorism is not the most pressing national security threat facing the United States.  
Great powers can be defeated only by other great powers – not by nonstate terrorists 
or by minor powers.”520  Bin laden’s network may be capable of killing a good 
number of people, but it is certainly not an existential threat in and of itself.521  
Indeed, the only reason comparatively insignificant organizations like al-Qaeda can 
even be said to be a serious danger to the United States at all is because America has 
unwisely chosen self-destructive policies that makes itself vulnerable to such actors.  
Thus, “The U.S. needs to be careful not to pay more attention to Islamic terrorist 
than to emerging powers.”522  Al-Qaeda may assist America down its self-selected 
path to slaughter, but ultimately it will be powerful rival states that serve as the final 
executioners. 
Of course, to avoid such a fate, U.S. policy makers need do no more than be 
honest.  Clearly, America’s strategy of preponderance is not based on the overly 
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optimistic liberal normative system its leaders publically endorse.  Rather, as has been 
shown, it is based on a realist understanding of the primacy of power and self-
interests.  Liberal rhetoric may help to mask this inclination toward realpolitik, but it 
certainly does nothing to change it.  Realist policymaking, however, does not have to 
be rooted in unending absolute hypocrisy.  Furthermore, and indeed “More 
important, preponderance is not the only realist option available to the United 
States.”523  Thus, if America wishes to find a practical means of escaping the trap it 
currently finds itself in, all it essentially must do is shed its façade of liberalism and 
forswear its desire for global hegemony.     
A New Path 
Once again, the decision should not be that difficult.  As even Huntington 
argues, attaining a sustainable “global empire” is in the end just not possible.524  On 
the other hand, there is good reason for U.S. officials to believe they can ensure solid 
national security without trying to attain global domination.  Fortunately for 
America, “Insular great powers (that is great powers that are geographically separated 
from great power rivals) are substantially less likely to be affected by instability than 
are states that face rivals close to home.” 525  Indeed, “Because of the interlocking 
effects of geography, nuclear weapons (which enhance insularity’s strategic 
advantages), and formidable military and economic capabilities, the United States is 
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virtually impregnable against direct attack.”526  Naturally, as history has shown, there 
will always be the possibility for exceptions to this rule.  But for the most part, “The 
risk of conflict, and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, 
derive directly from overseas commitments mandated by an expansive definition of 
U.S. interests.”527  Thus, if the United States pursues a new grand strategy that works 
to maximize its many advantages while simultaneously minimizing the dangerous 
practices that increase the chance of disaster, it will find that most of its current 
concerns will largely disappear.   
As most realists today would agree, the best choice for carrying out this 
special task is a strategy of “offshore balancing.”528  As Layne explains,  
Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests 
are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a 
‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) 
hegemon in the Middle East.  Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential 
threat to the US.  A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow 
of oil upon which the US economy, and the economies of the advanced 
industrial states depend.  As an offshore balancer, the US would rely on the tried 
and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic 
ambitions.  An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its 
ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the-
horizon military posture.  If – and only if – regional power balances look to be 
failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia.  Offshore balancing 
contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent, 
multiple poles of power.  Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the 
US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves.  
Offshore balancers, on the other hand, believe for an insular great power like the 
US, the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to 
other states the costs and risks of their defense.529   
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Furthermore, “As an insular great power in a multipolar world, the United States 
would retain a free hand strategically: although it might need to enter into temporary 
coalitions, America would disengage from permanent alliance relationships.”530  The 
natural result of this will be that America’s assistance will quickly come to be viewed 
as infinitely more valuable. 
As Walt insists, “Instead of bending over backward to convince the rest of 
the world that the United States is 100 percent reliable, U.S. leaders should be 
encouraging other states to bend over backward to keep us in their corners.”531  Yet, 
this will only be possible when these states come to realize U.S. assistance is based 
on certain conditions.532  Thus, “The United States would not withdraw from world 
affairs under this strategy, and it will still retain potent power-projection 
capabilities.”533  But the world will, nonetheless, be placed on notice that America’s 
inclination toward intervention, which during its bid for global domination was a 
virtual given, is no longer to be taken for granted. 
 An additional benefit of this approach is that, “Over time, a strategy of 
offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the 
hatred of radicals such as Osama bin Laden, and thus would make it less likely that 
the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not 
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welcome.”534  Granted, there will almost certainly remain those in the Muslim world 
who will continue to disapprove of what they see as Western vices, but “Anger and 
hatred toward the United States among Arabs and Muslims is largely driven by 
Washington’s policies, not by any deep-seated antipathy toward the West.”535  Hence, 
a change in grand strategy will eventually lead to a change in the strategic calculus of 
the region altogether.  Consequently, it can once again be noted that 
Offshore balancing costs considerably less money than does global dominance, 
allowing America to better prepare for the true threats it faces.  This is in good 
part because this strategy avoids occupying and governing countries in the 
developing world and therefore does not require large armies trained for 
counterinsurgency. Global dominators naturally think that the United States is 
destined to fight more wars like Afghanistan and Iraq, making it essential that we 
do counterinsurgency right the next time.536   
 
But in an age of offshore balancing, such concerns will gradually fade into the past 
like the bad memories of so many other bygone eras.  No longer will U.S presidents 
need to be afraid that someone else’s country might be “lost” to America.  The focus 
will simply be on the need to secure the United States itself.  
Similarly, there will also be little reason to fear that radical forces abroad 
might one day seize a fuel rich nation and cut off U.S. petroleum supplies.  To begin 
with, as bin Laden himself once explained, he certainly never had any intentions of 
drinking the oil.537  Thus, as one should really only expect, even if America’s 
retrenchment was to allow al-Qaeda linked zealots to somehow come to power in a 
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country like Saudi Arabia, the commodities they came to control would be sold to 
the world market in conformity with the normal laws of supply and demand.538  
What is more, “In an integrated, global oil market it is immaterial whether a hostile 
regime would sell oil directly to the US.  Because oil is fungible, all that matters is 
that such a regime makes its oil available to the market.”539  Finally, if an occasion 
ever arose in which some kind of broader unforeseeable crisis occurred, it would 
ultimately be a problem for the entire world, not just America.  The costs and 
dangers, therefore, could justifiably be divided evenly among the whole of the 
international community.  And, perhaps more importantly, so could the blame. 
Concluding Comments 
   Naturally, however, if it likes, the United States can always ignore such advice 
and continue to take all of the blame upon itself.  It can close its eyes to the realities 
of the increasingly dangerous world that it inhabits and simply push forward in a 
self-destructive struggle against a ghostly adversary, which is made victorious by the 
very actions taken to bring about its demise.  In the end, though, if it does choose 
this course, it will one day soon come to realize that all of its efforts were for not.  
Unfortunately, by sheer odds alone, the wide-ranging war America hopes to win is 
simply unwinnable.  According to polling data, only seven percent of the Muslim 
world’s population can be classified as “politically radicalized.”540  Yet, with an 
overall population of more than a billion people, the actual number that percentage 
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represents rests at somewhere around 91 million.541  Of course, being politically 
radicalized does not mean that each and every one of these individuals has engaged, 
or indeed ever will engage, in acts of violence.542  Still, they do, nonetheless, present 
organizations such as al-Qaeda with a huge pool for possible recruitment.543  In fact, 
if al-Qaeda is able to successfully wage a media war that persuade just a small 
percentage of this small percentage, it could quite easily bog the United States down 
until greater forces within the international system finally rise up to deliver America a 
death blow.  And, sadly, if thing continue as they are, it is quite possible that this is 
exactly what is to happen.   
 The launch of the so-called Arab Spring protests may have been truly 
historic, but as of now the United States has, regrettably, neglected to take advantage 
of this auspicious opening to make any significant changes to its policies.  As a result, 
the available polling numbers shows America still struggling to make inroads in the 
battle for hearts and minds.  Rhetorical spin may aid political leaders in trying to 
present the situation as some sort of contorted victory.  But, as the data suggests, it is 
unlikely that many in the Muslim world will be fooled by such propaganda.  Rather, 
it is more probable that like Zawahiri most will see such attempts as “Open deceit, 
unique hypocrisy, and unprecedented opportunism.”544  And that, of course, is a 
formula for diplomatic disaster. 
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 On the brighter side, however, U.S. military and intelligence services have at 
least been able to eliminate al-Qaeda’s chief spokesman. Though the killing of 
Osama bin Laden may not technically be a victory in the media war, it does 
obviously represent a clear chance for America to seize control of the overarching 
narrative.  Yet, here again, its leaders have failed to properly capitalize on this 
opportunity.  Perhaps justifiably, few would have likely wanted to announce a major 
shift in U.S. strategy from what many may have been considered a position of 
complete failure.  But with the death of bin Laden, coupled with the wave of changes 
taking place in the Arab Muslim world, the United States could have initiated a 
transition to offshore balancing from a rather respectable rhetorical position.   
As Mearsheimer explains, many great powers have made the collapse of their 
empires look as though they were the result of virtue.545  For instance, during its 
World War II struggle with rival great power Germany, Britain held tightly to 
valuable imperial colonies such as India.546  However, once “The fighting finished, 
England faced pressing business at home: tending her wounds and mending her 
economic fences.  She had neither the mood nor the might to frustrate India’s will to 
liberty.”547  Making matters worse, militant organizations such as the Hindu 
Mahasabha formed paramilitary wings designed to launch insurgent attacks against 
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British forces.548  It, therefore, quickly became rather clear that Britain would soon 
have no choice but to depart.  
Fortunately for the British, alongside organizations like the Hindu 
Mahasabha, there was also another movement led by a man named Mahatma 
Gandhi.  During the years of British strength, Gandhi’s non-violent protest 
philosophy had for most part been shown to be unproductive.549  Indeed, by the 
‘40s, a pledge he made in 1920 to remove British forces from India’s soil within a 
year had proven exceedingly hollow.550  Nevertheless, as the decade neared its close, 
Britain’s Labor government, facing serious post-war difficulties, eventually came to 
the conclusion that its only option was to withdraw from Indian Territory 
immediately.551  Thus, Indian independence was declared in 1947, and Gandhi, who 
the British naturally preferred over the “terrorists,” was left to be viewed by 
historians as the saintly figure whose peaceful ways miraculously persuaded Britain to 
allow India its freedom.552  In turn, Gandhi, who was reportedly said to have been 
touched by what he perceived as British altruism, commended his former colonial 
masters for their supposedly unprecedented act of selflessness.553     
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  Today, America finds itself in a similar situation.  The only difference being 
the fact that the United States is now in a position of imperial strain even before it 
has faced a challenge from a rival great power.  What this means, obviously, is that 
once it finally does, all may be lost.  Conversely, the United States can instead choose 
to become an offshore balancer and have its act of necessity be viewed as virtue.  It 
can allow the political change in the Middle East to serve as the catalyst for political 
change within its own borders and thereby save itself by simply placing the destiny of 
others in their own hands.  
Of course, this is not to say in any way that America should continue the 
game of pretending to be what it actually is not.  Indeed, it is very important that the 
United States actually avoid such a trap.  Often, over the course of human history, 
situations arise in which the goals of realism and the goals liberalism converge.554  
Naturally, “Under these circumstances, realist policies can be justified with liberal 
rhetoric without having to discuss the underlying power realities.”555  Hence, “This 
coincidence makes for an easy sell.”556  What such concealment does, however, is 
bypass a nation’s opportunity to have a truly democratic debate.  Thus,  
There is serious potential for backfire with cover-ups of this sort, because 
whenever leaders cannot sell a policy to their public in a rational-legal manner, 
there is a good chance that the problem is with the policy, not the audience.  
This is especially true if a substantial number of outside experts oppose or are 
likely to oppose the policy in question.557   
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Therefore, if America hopes to be credited with any virtue, it should be the virtue of 
honesty.  Admittedly, the shift from the use of romantic liberal rhetoric to a much 
more straightforward realist alternative may initially seem rather disconcerting to 
some.  But regardless of how attached they may have become to the propaganda of 
old, it is incumbent upon those in society to not only grow comfortable with realism, 
but to, in fact, demand it.  The only way the nation’s citizenry can ensure against 
being emotionally manipulated is if they insist on having policies conveyed to them 
in politically pragmatic terms.  Otherwise, they may soon one day find that the very 
future of their country has fallen victim to the shrewd deceptiveness of a power-
hungry political elite.  
 Obviously, America’s decision to come clean with itself will also be quite 
important to those in the Muslim world as well.  They may not praise the United 
States for its lackluster commitment to democracy abroad, but they will at least be 
able to respect the fact that after being shown by anti-autocracy protestors that its 
hypocrisy would no longer be tolerated even by moderates, America was willing to 
candidly acknowledge the error of its ways and change its approach.  A fairy tale 
ending it surely is not.  However, in an anarchic international system dominated by 
power politics, it is perhaps the closest the world will ever come to seeing one.             
The important thing is that America’s media war with bin Laden’s network is 
not unwinnable.  All U.S. officials have to do is eliminate the underlying duplicity 
that led to the media war to begin with.  Al-Qaeda, though dangerous, is, as it has 
been for some time, largely unpopular.  Its only strength is U.S. weakness.  But if the 
United States does not alter its path, al-Qaeda’s message will continue to have 
resonance in the Muslim world, and it will continue to pose a threat to U.S. security.   
  138 
Even if every one of its leaders, and indeed every one of its operatives, is 
killed, there will always be other, perhaps far more dangerous, organizations that are 
both in agreement with al-Qaeda’s argument and willing to pick up its mantle.  Thus, 
for the future, it would behoove the United States to implement a grand strategy that 
will isolate al-Qaeda and its line of thinking as much as possible.  Offshore balancing 
allows America to practice what it preaches.  It, therefore, takes away from groups 
such as al-Qaeda their most powerful ammunition.  Yes, a certain level of 
contradiction is to be found in every system humanity creates.558  But, offshore 
balancing minimizes these contradictions to perhaps the greatest extent that can be 
reasonably achieved.  Al-Qaeda’s principal messenger has already been killed.  Now, 
if America would only agree to adopt an offshore balancing grand strategy, along 
with the frank realist dialogue that must accompany it, al-Qaeda’s very message can 
be put to death as well. 
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